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Giving Due Process Its Due: Why
Deliberate Indifference Should Be
Confined to Claims Arising Under the
Cruel and Unusual Punishment Clause
Shad M. Brown*
Abstract
This Note discusses culpability requirements for claims
brought by pretrial detainees and convicted prisoners. The initial
focus is on deliberate indifference, a culpability requirement
formulated under the Cruel and Unusual Punishment Clause but
symmetrically applied to claims arising under the Due Process
Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. The Note then shifts to
Kingsley v. Hendrickson, a landmark Supreme Court decision that
casts doubt on the application of Eighth-Amendment standards to
Fourteenth-Amendment claims. Finally, this Note advocates for the
application of objective unreasonableness, a different culpability
requirement, to claims arising under the Due Process Clause. It
does so on the basis that due process is a dynamic concept,
independent of the Eighth Amendment’s demands.

* Candidate for J.D., May 2021, Washington and Lee University School of
Law. I would like to thank Professor Brandon Hasbrouck, who pushed me not
only to broaden my search for the right solution to the problem presented, but
also to write with the depth and illustration necessary to guide the reader to it as
well. I would also like to extend my gratitude to my Note Editor, Maria
Liberopoulos, for leading me through this writing process with as little pain and
confusion as possible. Finally, I would like to express my appreciation for my
parents, Randall and Tami Brown, and my grandmother, Eileen Heard. I cannot
envision where I would be without their love, support, and counsel, but I know
that I would not be here, writing this Note.

649

650

27 WASH. & LEE J. CIV. RTS. & SOC. JUST. 649 (2021)
Table of Contents

I. Introduction .............................................................................. 651
II. Fundamentals and Background............................................. 656
A. Section 1983 Actions ............................................................ 657
B. The Deliberate Indifference Standard ................................ 661
1. The Formulation of Deliberate Indifference .................... 662
2. The Application of Deliberate Indifference to the Claims of
Pretrial Detainees ................................................................. 665
III. The Effect of Kingsley v. Hendrickson.................................. 671
A. Kingsley v. Hendrickson ...................................................... 671
1. Background........................................................................ 672
2. The Supreme Court’s Opinion .......................................... 674
B. The Consequences of Kingsley v. Hendrickson................... 676
1. Expanding Kingsley to a Broader Range of Claims ........ 677
2. Confining Kingsley to Excessive-Force Claims................ 684
IV. Detainees’ Claims Should Only Require Objective
Unreasonableness ........................................................................ 688
A. The Contours of Substantive Due Process Are Not Limited
by the Bill of Rights .................................................................. 689
B. Kingsley Recognized A Different Culpability Standard for
Detainees’ Due Process Liberty ............................................... 692
C. Courts’ Justifications for Applying Deliberate Indifference
Are Unpersuasive in Light of Kingsley and The Broad
Interpretation of Due Process .................................................. 694
1. Interpretive Comparisons ................................................. 695
2. Operational Realities ........................................................ 696
D. The Objective Standard Makes a Big Difference While
Requiring a Small Change ....................................................... 699
V. Conclusion ............................................................................... 702

GIVING DUE PROCESS ITS DUE

651

In an impressive body of decisions this Court has decided that the
Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment expresses a
demand for civilized standards which are not defined by the
specifically enumerated guarantees of the Bill of Rights. They
neither contain the particularities of the first eight amendments
nor are they confined to them.
—Justice Felix Frankfurter (1947)
I. Introduction
Pretrial detainees—those who are in government custody in
connection with a crime for which they have not been convicted1—
have suffered because of a failure to distinguish.2 Imagine that a
man named Anthony is arrested for driving under the influence.
The arresting officer searches his car and discovers an empty bottle
of insulin with his name on the prescription label. Anthony tells
the officer that he is diabetic and in need of the full prescription at
his apartment. The officer transports him straight to the local jail,
where he informs a corrections officer of the statement and the
empty prescription before going about his day. The corrections
officer does not think that Anthony’s condition is serious and
processes him like any other new arrival. A few hours later he is
found unconscious on the floor of his cell, suffering from a diabetic
coma.
Anthony, a pretrial detainee, files a lawsuit alleging that the
corrections officer deprived him of his right to adequate medical
care in violation of the Fourteenth Amendment. Though the
substantive law is derived from a constitutional provision,3 the
claim itself is brought into court under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, a federal
statute.4 During the litigation, the officer testifies that he did not
1. See Miranda v. Cnty. of Lake, 900 F.3d 335, 350 (7th Cir. 2018) (stating
that pretrial detainees “are still entitled to the constitutional presumption of
innocence”).
2. See infra notes 240–260 and accompanying text (differentiating the Due
Process Clause from the individual provisions contained in the Bill of Rights).
3. See 2 ISIDORE SILVER, POLICE CIVIL LIABILITY § 8A.09 (Matthew Bender &
Co. rev. ed. 2019) (discussing various types of claims alleging unconstitutional
conditions of confinement).
4. See infra notes 44–48 and accompanying text (discussing the
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realize that the lack of insulin could have such dire consequences.
Whether or not Anthony can overcome this claim is largely
dependent on where the suit was filed.5 If it is filed in Atlanta, he
will have to prove that the officer was actually aware of the danger
a lack of insulin can have for a person with diabetes—a
consequence of the culpability requirement known as “deliberate
indifference.”6
Anthony should not be subject to the test for deliberate
indifference simply because he filed a claim in Atlanta. The issue
with this imposition does not stem from the fact that proof of
culpability is required generally but rather that the wrong kind of
culpability is being applied.7 This Note argues for the uniform
application of a different culpability standard: That pretrial
detainees’ claims alleging unconstitutional conditions of
confinement should be subject to the test for objective
unreasonableness instead of deliberate indifference.
As determined by the Supreme Court, deliberate indifference
is the second prong of a test that governs claims under 42 U.S.C.
§ 1983 alleging unconstitutional prison conditions in violation of
the Eighth Amendment’s Cruel and Unusual Punishment Clause.8
It requires a defendant to have subjective awareness that her
conduct creates a substantial risk of harm to a prisoner.9 Without
properly alleging and proving that this “sufficiently culpable state
of mind” existed at the time she was injured, a prisoner cannot
successfully state a claim that the conditions of her confinement
violated the Eighth Amendment.10 The Court has justified
jurisdictional nature of a federal statute).
5. See infra notes 171–261 and accompanying text (discussing a current
split among federal Courts of Appeals).
6. See infra notes 246–256 (discussing an opinion published by the U.S.
Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit).
7. See Miranda, 900 F.3d at 352–53 (discussing the requirement that
something more than “mere negligence” is required for a constitutional violation).
8. See Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S. 825, 834 (1994) (“To violate the Cruel
and Unusual Punishment Clause, a prison official must have a sufficiently
culpable state of mind.”).
9. See id. at 837 (“[T]he official must both be aware of facts from which the
inference could be drawn that a substantial risk of serious harm exists, and he
must also draw that inference.”).
10. See id. at 834 (“It is not, however, every injury suffered by one prisoner
at the hands of another that translates into constitutional liability for prison
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deliberate indifference on the basis that it adheres to precedent
interpreting the Cruel and Unusual Punishment Clause to be
violated only by the “unnecessary and wanton infliction of pain.”11
The problem lies in this connection between deliberate
indifference and the Cruel and Unusual Punishment Clause.12
That constitutional provision governs the conditions of correctional
facilities as they relate to prisoners—people who have been
convicted of a crime.13 The substandard and harmful jail conditions
affecting pretrial detainees are instead governed by the Due
Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.14 The peculiarities
of the two constitutional provisions are not coextensive.15 While the
Eighth Amendment allows a prisoner to be punished within
certain limits, the Fourteenth Amendment prohibits punishment
entirely.16
In its landmark 2015 decision Kingsley v. Hendrickson,17 the
Supreme Court considered the dichotomy between the two
amendments in-depth.18 In particular, the Court discussed the
absence of permissible punishment under the Fourteenth
Amendment.19 The case ultimately resulted in two distinct
officials responsible for the victim’s safety.”).
11. See id. (discussing the requirements for harm that rises to the level of an
Eighth Amendment violation).
12. See infra notes 13–14 and accompanying text (discussing the relative
differences between prisoners, pretrial detainees, and the constitutional
provisions that protect them).
13. See Miranda v. Cnty. of Lake, 900 F.3d 335, 350 (7th Cir. 2018)
(discussing the relative constitutional statuses of prisoners and pretrial
detainees).
14. See id. (“Pretrial detainees stand in a different position: [T]hey have not
been convicted of anything, and they are still entitled to the constitutional
presumption of innocence.”).
15. See infra notes 267–272 and accompanying text (discussing the
independent nature of the Due Process Clause).
16. See Miranda, 900 F.3d at 350 (“Thus, the punishment model is
inappropriate for [pretrial detainees].”).
17. See Kingsley v. Hendrickson, 576 U.S. 389, 396–97 (2015) (holding that
a pretrial detainee must show only that the force purposely or knowingly used
against him was objectively unreasonable in order to demonstrate that it was
excessive in violation of the Fourteenth Amendment's Due Process Clause).
18. See id. at 400 (“The language of the two Clauses differs, and the nature
of the claims often differs.”).
19. See id. (“And, most importantly, pretrial detainees (unlike convicted
prisoners) cannot be punished at all, much less ‘maliciously and sadistically.’”
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culpability standards for excessive-force claims, depending on
whether the plaintiff is a pretrial detainee claiming protection
under the Due Process Clause or a prisoner pointing to the Eighth
Amendment.20 Under this new regime, a pretrial detainee only
needs to provide objective evidence to satisfy the culpability
requirement.21
In the wake of the Kingsley decision, lower courts have
reevaluated the application of the deliberate indifference standard
to pretrial detainees’ claims of unconstitutional jail conditions.22
While some view it as a broad statement on the Due Process
Clause,23 others perceive it as too narrow to overturn established
precedent.24 The former group is correct on the basis of the
language used in Kingsley.25
However, the issue is broader than that identified in Kingsley
and its progeny.26 Courts were mistaken in mechanically grafting
the deliberate indifference standard to due-process claims in the
first place.27 Kingsley primarily discussed the punishment
dichotomy, but that is only a single consequence of the proper
interpretation of the Due Process Clause.28 That constitutional
provision is both broader than and independent of the individual
guarantees contained in the Bill of Rights, including the
prohibition of cruel and unusual punishments.29 It is this concept
(quoting Ingraham v. Wright, 430 U.S. 651, 671–72, n.40 (1977))).
20. See id. at 397 (discussing the appropriate culpability standard for a
pretrial detainee’s excessive-force claim).
21. See id. at 396–97 (“[A] pretrial detainee must show only that the force
purposely or knowingly used against him was objectively unreasonable.”).
22. See infra notes 171–250 (discussing cases dealing with the culpability
issue subsequent to the decision in Kingsley).
23. See infra notes 175–225 (discussing courts that have applied objective
unreasonableness to pretrial detainees’ conditions-of-confinement claims).
24. See infra notes 232–251 (discussing courts that continue to apply
deliberate indifference to pretrial detainees’ conditions-of-confinement claims).
25. See infra notes 288–298 and accompanying text (supporting the notion
that Kingsley requires a broader application of objective unreasonableness).
26. See infra notes 27–29 and accompanying text (discussing the contours of
the Due Process Clause).
27. See infra notes 280–287 and accompanying text (discussing the
independent character of the Due Process Clause).
28. See infra notes 267–281 and accompanying text (stating that due process
“consists of collective standards that take on their own character”).
29. See infra notes 280–287 and accompanying text (discussing the
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that should give courts pause before creating parallels between
individual rights and due process protections.30 The independent
character of the Due Process Clause has always demanded that
distinct culpability standards at least be considered for those
claiming its protections.31 Kingsley merely provided the candidate.
This Note proceeds as follows. Part II discusses the
fundamentals of culpability requirements and deliberate
indifference. This begins with a discussion of 42 U.S.C. § 1983, the
statute that provides jurisdiction to federal courts over various
claims brought by both pretrial detainees and convicted prisoners.
The focus there is on the statute’s nature as a procedural device,
effectively covering different claims that are governed by their own
unique substantive law. After that, the history and purpose of the
deliberate indifference standard are explored before a discussion
on courts’ justifications for applying it to pretrial detainees’ claims.
Part III discusses Kingsley v. Hendrickson and the legal
landscape it has created. First, there is a discussion of the case
itself. The focus is directed to the part of the Supreme Court’s
reasoning that dealt with the differences between pretrial
detainees, prisoners, and their respective constitutional rights.
Next, the discussion focuses on Courts of Appeals opinions that
have directly grappled with the implication that Kingsley
necessitates the elimination of deliberate indifference as a
requirement for pretrial detainees’ conditions-of-confinement
claims.
Part IV advocates for the application of an objective
unreasonableness standard in place of deliberate indifference. The
discussion is initially directed at the expansive scope and character
of the Due Process Clause. In particular, it focuses on the
relationship between that provision and the individual guarantees
contained in the Bill of Rights. Next, the emphasis is on Kingsley’s
reasoning and how it relates to the expansive interpretation of the
Due Process Clause. The conversation then shifts to the
peculiarities of the Due Process Clause).
30. See infra notes 283–288 and accompanying text (admonishing the rote
application of standards derived from the Bill of Rights to the Due Process
Clause).
31. See infra notes 280–283 and accompanying text (stating that due-process
standards “stand on their own, not to be determined by the scope, character, or
particularities” of the Eighth Amendment).
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justifications offered for the application of deliberate indifference
to pretrial detainees’ claims. The majority of this conversation
focuses on the inconsistencies between those justifications and the
expansive interpretation of due process. The argument then
concludes by demonstrating that the application of the objective
standard requires only a minute change to the existing framework
for conditions-of-confinement claims. The practical importance of
this change are demonstrated through a hypothetical situation.
II. Fundamentals and Background
Claims alleging unconstitutional conditions of confinement
are brought into court under 42 U.S.C. § 1983.32 Although the
statute applies to both prisoners and pretrial detainees, it
primarily acts as a procedural device that grants a court
jurisdiction.33 This results in the application of distinct substantive
law, depending on the underlying violation.34
When that violation is the Cruel and Unusual Punishment
Clause, conditions-of-confinement claims require a plaintiff to
prove the defendant’s culpability under the deliberate indifference
standard.35 This is a subjective standard that has been explicitly
determined by the Supreme Court to apply in those cases.36 Similar
claims brought by pretrial detainees allege violations of the Due
Process Clause.37 Lower courts have equally applied deliberate
indifference to those claims in the absence of any express guidance
by the Supreme Court.38
32. Cf. 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (2018) (creating an “action at law” where there is a
“deprivation of any rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the
Constitution”).
33. See infra notes 49–57 and accompanying text (examining the
relationship between § 1983 and an underlying violation of federal law).
34. See infra notes 49–57 and accompanying text (discussing culpability
requirements for § 1983 claims).
35. See infra notes 65–71 and accompanying text (discussing the subjective
inquiry for prisoners’ conditions-of-confinement claims).
36. See SHELDON H. NAHMOD, CIVIL RIGHTS AND CIVIL LIBERTIES LITIGATION:
THE LAW OF SECTION 1983 § 3:7 (4th ed. 2013) (stating the culpability standards
for various claims brought under the Eighth Amendment).
37. See infra note 68 and accompanying text (discussing claims that are
permissible under the Fourteenth Amendment).
38. See infra notes 95–102 (discussing lower courts’ analysis of pretrial
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The following subparts explore the fundamentals and
background of both § 1983 and the deliberate indifference
standard. In particular, they examine the procedural nature of
§ 1983 and the reasoning behind a subjective culpability
requirement for unconstitutional punishments. This Part will
conclude with a discussion of courts’ justifications for applying
deliberate indifference to pretrial detainees’ claims.
A. Section 1983 Actions
The earliest Civil Rights Acts were passed in the post-Civil
War era to provide relief for African Americans in the former
Confederacy.39 The purpose of the initial Act was to confer all of
the civil rights realized by whites to freedwomen and freedmen.40
So that its provisions could be enforced as intended, the Act
granted subject matter jurisdiction to district courts over lawsuits
in which citizens claimed that their civil rights had been violated.41
The second Act was put into place with the purpose of enforcing
the provisions of the Fourteenth Amendment.42 The next year, the
Civil Rights Act of 1871 amended the statute, providing federal
courts with subject matter jurisdiction over claims brought under
the Fourteenth Amendment against individual states and their
agents.43

detainees’ claims).
39. See Theodore Eisenberg, Section 1983: Doctrinal Foundations and an
Empirical Study, 67 CORNELL L. REV. 482, 484–85 (1982) (discussing the social
forces that led to original enactment of the statute as Section 1 of the Civil Rights
Act of 1871).
40. See Hague v. Comm. for Indus. Org., 307 U.S. 496, 509 (1939) (“None
other than citizens of the United States were within the provisions of the Act.”).
41. See id. (discussing the practical effects of the first Civil Rights Act).
42. See id. at 510 (stating that the second Civil Rights Act was put in place
to enforce the Fourteenth Amendment “pursuant to the authority granted
Congress by the fifth section of the amendment”).
43. See District of Columbia v. Carter, 409 U.S. 418, 428–29 (1973)
superseded by statute, Act of Dec. 29, 1979, Pub. L. No. 96-170, 93 Stat. 1284
(including the District of Columbia under the jurisdiction of 42 U.S.C. § 1983)
(“Congress had neither the means nor the authority to exert any direct control,
on a day-to-day basis, over the actions of state officials. The solution chosen was
to involve the federal judiciary.”).
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The current version of the 1871 Act is encoded at 42 U.S.C.
§ 1983.44 This is the vehicle through which an individual pursues
relief for a constitutional violation committed by a state or its
officials.45 The essential elements required by the statute ask
whether the defendant, acting “under color of state law,” deprived
the plaintiff of some federally-guaranteed right, immunity, or
privilege.46 The phrase “under color of state law” refers to acts
made possible only because the defendant—also known as a state
actor—has some authority granted to him by a state or one of its
subdivisions.47 Once this authority is established, the plaintiff
must prove the state actor’s conduct violated an underlying federal
right.48
Section 1983 does not impose a specific “state-of-mind”
requirement.49 Nothing in the text or legislative history conveys a
congressional intent to limit claims on the basis of a state actor’s
motive in violating a plaintiff’s rights.50 However, the statute still
requires some state of mind to be proven with respect to the
44. See 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (2018) (stating that the statute is “derived from act
Apr. 20, 1871, ch. 22, § 1, 17 Stat. 13.”).
45. See id.
Every person who, under color of any statute, ordinance, regulation,
custom, or usage, of any State or Territory or the District of Columbia,
subjects, or causes to be subjected, any citizen of the United States or
other person within the jurisdiction thereof to the deprivation of any
rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the Constitution and laws,
shall be liable to the party injured in an action at law, suit in equity,
or other proper proceeding for redress . . . .
46. See Parratt v. Taylor, 451 U.S. 527, 535 (1981) (stating the initial inquiry
required for any § 1983 claim).
47. See United States v. Classic, 313 U.S. 299, 326 (1941) (“Misuse of power,
possessed by virtue of state law and made possible only because the wrongdoer is
clothed with the authority of state law, is action taken ‘under color of’ state law.”).
48. See Daniels v. Williams, 474 U.S. 327, 329–30 (1986) (discussing the
different requirements between 42 U.S.C. § 1983 and its criminal counterpart, 18
U.S.C. § 242).
49. See Parratt, 451 U.S. at 534 (finding that the question of whether
negligence is a sufficient state of mind in a § 1983 action “may well not be
susceptible of a uniform answer across the entire spectrum” of constitutional
violations for which the statute provides redress).
50. See id. at 534–35 (comparing § 1983 to a criminal counterpart that
requires a defendant to act “willfully” and concluding that the differences between
the two statutes suggests that a state-of-mind “gloss” should not be imposed on
the former).
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underlying violation.51 Because it affords a civil remedy, the
requisite state of mind is generally found in the realm of tort law,52
and—most importantly—it varies with the particular right that
the plaintiff claims has been violated.53
An example may provide clarity about how a claim under
§ 1983 works. Suppose that Cynthia is employed as a patrol officer
for the Indianapolis Metropolitan Police Department, where
George, Sr., serves as the Chief of Police. In the course of her work,
Cynthia divulges information about George, Jr., a serial burglar,
to a detective at the South Bend Police Department. Cynthia
knows that George, Jr., is the son of the police chief.
The information given by Cynthia leads to George, Jr.’s arrest
in South Bend. After pleading guilty and being sent to the Indiana
State Prison, George, Jr., refuses to enter the cell to which he has
been assigned. This leads to an altercation where Christian, a
corrections officer, handcuffs George, Jr., and then punches him in
the face, breaking his jaw. In his anger, George, Sr., transfers
Cynthia to night shift duty.
Cynthia and George, Jr., both sue under § 1983. They must
both prove that the respective defendants were acting “under color
of state law.”54 For Cynthia, this is George Sr.’s use of power over
the Department’s employees entrusted to him by the city of
Indianapolis. For George, Jr., this is Christian’s authority over
prisoners granted by the State of Indiana.
Once the “under color of state law” requirement is met, the
plaintiffs’ claims will differ because they must each prove an
underlying violation of federal law.55 Cynthia may pursue a claim
51. See Bd. of Cnty. Comm’rs v. Brown, 520 U.S. 397, 405 (1997) (noting that
proof of § 1983’s essential elements is insufficient without the presence of a
requisite state of mind).
52. See Parratt, 451 U.S. at 535 (“Section 1983 should be read against the
background of tort liability that makes a man responsible for the natural
consequences of his actions.” (quoting Monroe v. Pape, 365 U.S. 167, 187 (1961))).
53. See Jordan v. Fox, Rothschild, O’Brien & Frankel, 20 F.3d 1250, 1277 (3d
Cir. 1994) (“[T]he Supreme Court has plainly read into [the statute] a state of
mind requirement specific to the particular federal right underlying a § 1983
claim.”).
54. See supra notes 46–50 and accompanying text (describing the “under
color of state law” requirement for a valid Section 1983 claim).
55. See Williams, 474 U.S at 329–30 (describing Section 1983’s requirement
that an underlying federal right has been violated).
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alleging that George, Sr., violated her First Amendment right to
free speech by retaliating against her for divulging information
that led to his son’s arrest. This would require her to prove that
her speech was a matter of public concern and the act of changing
her hours was substantially based on that speech.56
George, Jr., on the other hand, may claim that his right to be
free from excessive force under the Cruel and Unusual
Punishment Clause was violated. Unlike Cynthia’s claim, this has
nothing to do with the defendant’s reaction to his speech. Instead,
he would have to prove that the Christian’s punch was applied
“maliciously and sadistically to cause harm” and not “a good-faith
effort to maintain or restore discipline.”57
Although the plaintiffs both allege violations under § 1983, the
only similarity between their claims is the requirement that the
defendant acted while using authority granted by state law.58
Other than that, their claims require completely different types of
proof, as derived from the underlying violations of federal law the
respective plaintiffs have alleged.59 With respect to the
state-of-mind requirements, Cynthia must show that George Sr.,
placed substantial weight on her protected speech when making
the decision to change her hours, while George, Jr., must prove
that Christian maliciously and sadistically intended to harm
him.60 Despite using the same statute to attach federal
jurisdiction, the ultimate success of the plaintiffs’ respective claims
hinges on different kinds of evidence.

56. See Gustafson v. Jones, 290 F.3d 895, 906 (7th Cir. 2002) (describing the
elements required for a Section 1983 claim where the underlying federal right is
the First Amendment’s right to free speech and the alleged violation is a
retaliation to the plaintiff’s speech).
57. See Hudson v. McMillian, 503 U.S. 1, 7 (1992) (describing the key inquiry
for a Section 1983 claim where the underlying federal right is the Eighth
Amendment’s proscription of “cruel and unusual punishment” and the alleged
violation is excessive force used against the plaintiff).
58. See supra notes 46–50 and accompanying text (describing the “under
color of state law” requirement of § 1983 claims).
59. See supra notes 49–53 and accompanying text (describing § 1983’s
requirement that a plaintiff prove a violation of an underlying federal right).
60. See supra notes 56–58 and accompanying text (stating the state-of-mind
requirements for the plaintiffs’ respective claims).
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B. The Deliberate Indifference Standard
Because the validity of a § 1983 claim depends on proving the
deprivation of a discrete federal right,61 the plaintiff must
demonstrate that the defendant’s state of mind was consistent
with a violation of that right.62 This results in different culpability
requirements for claims that come into court under § 1983 that
allege different underlying violations of substantive federal law.63
The separate standards have largely been identified by judicial
precedent.64
For a class of § 1983 claims brought by prisoners under the
Eighth Amendment’s guarantee against cruel and unusual
punishments, the generally applicable state-of-mind standard is
“deliberate indifference.”65 That is not to say every
Eighth-Amendment claim must meet the standard.66 However, it
encompasses a broad range of conduct including inadequate jail
conditions, denial of medical care, failure to protect against inmate
assault, and failure to prevent suicide.67
Similar claims brought by pretrial detainees are subject to the
Fourteenth Amendment’s guarantee of due process, without

61. See supra notes 48–55 and accompanying text (discussing the
requirements of a valid § 1983 claim).
62. See Fox, Rothschild, O’Brien & Frankel, 20 F.3d at 1277 (discussing the
Supreme Court’s construction of § 1983).
63. See SHELDON H. NAHMOD, CIVIL RIGHTS AND CIVIL LIBERTIES LITIGATION:
THE LAW OF SECTION 1983 § 3:7 (4th ed. 2013)
The relevance of the defendant’s state of mind depends on the nature
of the constitutional violation. For example, the Supreme Court held
that at least ‘deliberate indifference’ is necessary to make out an
Eighth Amendment violation. It also held that intentional interception
of lawyer-client by an informer or intentional use of the conversations
must occur to make out a Sixth Amendment violation.
64. See id. § 3:2 (“Different Fourteenth Amendment violations (and hence
Bill of Rights violations) require different states of mind, apparently because of
the history and the language of the applicable constitutional provisions.”).
65. See id. § 3:28 (discussing the relevant state-of-mind standards required
for convicted prisoners who bring § 1983 claims under the Eighth Amendment).
66. See id. (“[I]n prison security cases, including those involving the use of
force by prison guards, malicious and sadistic intent is required for an Eighth
Amendment violation, a more defendant-protective standard.”).
67. See 2 SILVER, supra note 3, § 8A.09 (discussing various types of claims
that may be brought under the Eighth Amendment).
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regard to the provisions of the Eighth Amendment.68 However,
federal courts have applied the deliberate indifference standard to
pretrial detainees’ claims just as they have applied it to claims
brought by convicted prisoners.69 While courts have offered a
number of reasons for this application,70 they have done so without
any express guidance from the Supreme Court.71 Although this
Note argues the application has been in error, it is important to
comprehend the background and mechanics of the deliberate
indifference standard to see why the courts have missed the mark
on this issue.
1. The Formulation of Deliberate Indifference
Claims requiring deliberate indifference are premised on the
idea that contemporary society will not tolerate certain conduct by
corrections officials when people under their care—who are
essentially at their mercy—face some threat of harm.72 The initial
formulation of the culpability requirement was made under the
Eighth Amendment,73 which states that “[e]xcessive bail shall not
68. See id. § 8A.09(2) (“[T]he Eighth Amendment encompassed imposed
upon persons convicted of a crime while general due-process principles under the
Fourteenth Amendment protected jail arrestees awaiting trial.”).
69. See infra notes 95–133 and accompanying text (discussing lower courts’
justifications for applying standards formulated under the Eighth Amendment to
claims that arise under due process).
70. See infra notes 95–97 and accompanying text (discussing judicial
opinions in which Federal Courts of Appeals have extended the
deliberate-indifference requirement to claims brought by pretrial detainees under
the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment).
71. See 2 SILVER, supra note 3, § 8A.09(4)(a) (“Although its logical soundness
is questionable, in the absence of Supreme Court guidance, lower courts have
often applied the exacting standards of deliberate indifference (applicable to
‘punishments’) to jail conditions.”).
72. See Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97, 103–05 (1976) (“The infliction of such
unnecessary suffering is inconsistent with contemporary standards of
decency . . . codifying the common-law view that ‘it is but just that the public be
required to care for the prisoner, who cannot by reason of the deprivation of his
liberty, care for himself.’” (quoting Spicer v. Williamson, 132, S.E. 291, 293 (N.C.
1926))).
73. See id. at 101 (“The gravamen of respondent’s [Section] 1983 complaint
is that petitioners have subjected him to cruel and unusual punishment in
violation of the Eighth Amendment, made applicable to the States by the
Fourteenth”).
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be required, nor excessive fines imposed, nor cruel and unusual
punishments inflicted.”74 The essential effect of this is that
deliberate indifference is itself considered a punishment.75 To the
author’s knowledge, the Supreme Court has not explicitly analyzed
deliberate indifference under any other constitutional provision.76
Being developed in an Eighth-Amendment vacuum,77 the
culpability requirement has been tailored to meet the prohibition
on “cruel and unusual punishments.”78 In line with modern
standards of decency,79 this imposes a duty on prison officials to
provide inmates with adequate necessities.80 To state a cause of
action on the basis of an official’s failure in this respect, a plaintiff
must provide subjective proof of the defendant’s state of mind.81
The standard itself is essentially tied to the criminal-law definition
of “recklessness,” where the defendant “must both be aware of facts
from which the inference could be drawn that a substantial risk of
serious harm exists, and he must also draw the inference.”82
As an example, suppose that Dwight, a corrections officer in
Virginia, is tasked with finding an appropriate cell in which to
place Jim, a large and violent inmate who becomes enraged
whenever he hears any language spoken other than English.
74. U.S. CONST. amend VIII.
75. See Estelle, 429 U.S. at 104 (“We therefore conclude that deliberate
indifference to serious medical needs of prisoners constitutes the ‘unnecessary
and wanton infliction of pain’ proscribed by the Eighth Amendment.” (quoting
Gregg v. Georgia, 428, U.S. 153, 173 (1976))).
76. Cf. infra notes 111–133 and accompanying text (discussing cases that
acknowledged the lack of a clear indication by the Supreme Court).
77. See id. (showing the Supreme Court has only analyzed deliberate
indifference under the Eighth Amendment).
78. See infra notes 92–94 and accompanying text (discussing the
relationship between the subjective standard and the Eighth Amendment’s focus
on “punishments”).
79. See Gamble, 429 U.S. at 103–05 (explaining modern standards of
decency).
80. See Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S. 825, 832 (1994) (discussing the various
acts and omissions that can constitute a deprivation of a person’s
Eighth-Amendment right to be free from cruel and unusual punishment).
81. See id. at 837 (“We reject petitioner’s invitation to adopt an objective test
for deliberate indifference.”).
82. See id. at 836–37 (“The criminal law, however, generally permits a
finding of recklessness only when a person disregards a risk of harm of which he
is aware.”).
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Dwight ultimately places him in a cell with Oscar, an inmate who
often speaks to himself Spanish. This leads to an altercation where
Jim assaults Oscar, causing permanent injury. If Oscar wishes to
file a claim under § 1983 on the basis that Dwight failed to provide
him with a reasonable degree of safety, he must prove that the
officer was deliberately indifferent.83 Oscar would have to
adequately demonstrate two things to meet the standard. The first
is that Dwight was aware of the facts suggesting that an assault
could occur if both inmates were placed in the same cell.84 This
might consist of Jim’s physical capability and violent disposition
toward speakers of foreign languages, along with Oscar’s tendency
to speak Spanish. The second requirement is that Dwight made
the proper inference based on those facts—that there was a serious
risk of Jim violently assaulting Oscar.85
When the Supreme Court initially held that subjective
awareness was the proper inquiry, it was faced with the possibility
of using a standard of recklessness derived from private civil law.86
This is because the definition of recklessness varies depending on
which area of the law is being discussed.87 If a civil-law standard
is used, a plaintiff would be able to prove a sufficiently culpable
state of mind on a purely objective set of facts.88
The reason the Court used the subjective standard derived
from criminal law lies in the connection between the type of claim
and the federal law from which it was derived.89 Section 1983 does
not create a cause of action, but merely serves as a vehicle through
which a plaintiff may claim a violation of some federally-granted

83. See supra note 80 and accompanying text (identifying deliberate
indifference as the appropriate state-of-mind required for a prisoner’s claim that
state actors failed to provide him with reasonable safety).
84. See Brennan, 511 U.S. at 836–37 (stating the first requirement of the
deliberate indifference inquiry).
85. See id. (stating the second requirement of the deliberate indifference
inquiry).
86. See id. (discussing the parties’ arguments for the proper state-of-mind
inquiry).
87. See id. (finding that the term recklessness “is not self-defining”).
88. See id. at 836 (“The civil law generally calls a person reckless who acts
or (if a person has a duty to act) fails to act in the face of an unjustifiably high
risk of harm that is either known or is so obvious that it should be known.”).
89. See id. (contrasting different definitions of “recklessness”).
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right, privilege, or immunity.90 For deliberate indifference, the
underlying federal law is the Eighth Amendment’s ban on cruel
and unusual punishments.91 The operative term here is
“punishments,” as the amendment does not outlaw cruel and
unusual “conditions.”92 Under the Court’s jurisprudence, a “cruel
and unusual punishment” is equated with “an unnecessary and
wanton infliction of pain.”93 This definition requires a subjective
inquiry into the defendant’s state of mind because it “isolates those
who inflict punishment.”94
2. The Application of Deliberate Indifference to the Claims of
Pretrial Detainees
Despite a lack of discussion by the Supreme Court,95 lower
courts have applied the deliberate indifference standard to pretrial
detainees’ claims.96 Unlike prisoners, pretrial detainees rely on the
Fourteenth Amendment’s guarantee of due process rather than on
the Eighth Amendment.97 Despite this discrepancy, lower courts
90. See supra notes 39–53 and accompanying text (discussing the procedural
nature of § 1983).
91. Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97, 104 (1976).
92. See Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S. 825, 837 (1994) (discussing the scope of
Eighth Amendment violations).
93. See Wilson v. Seiter, 501 U.S. 294, 299–300 (1991) (“It is obduracy and
wantonness, not inadvertence or error in good faith, that characterize the conduct
prohibited by the Cruel and Unusual Punishments Clause. . . .” (quoting Whitley
v. Albers, 475 U.S. 312, 319 (1986))) (emphasis in original).
94. See Farmer, 511 U.S. at 838–40.
[T]he official must both be aware of facts from which the
inference could be drawn that a substantial risk of harm exists,
and he must also draw the inference. This approach comports
best with the text of the Amendment as our cases have
interpreted it. The Eighth Amendment does not outlaw cruel
and unusual “conditions”; it outlaws cruel and unusual
“punishments.”
95. See Estelle, 429 U.S. at 104 (holding that “prisoner’s pro se
complaint . . . was insufficient to state a cause of action”).
96. See infra notes 99–133 and accompanying text (discussing lower-court
opinions applying deliberate indifference to pretrial detainees’ claims).
97. See infra note 113 and accompanying text (discussing authority
acknowledging the correct constitutional provision under which pretrial
detainees may bring a claim).
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have frequently used Eighth-Amendment standards to govern
their claims.98 The following sections provide an overview of due
process under the Fourteenth Amendment and lower courts’
reasoning in applying deliberate indifference to claims that fall
under it.
a. The Fourteenth Amendment as an Underlying Federal Right
As previously discussed, 42 U.S.C. § 1983 is merely a “vehicle”
that a plaintiff must attach to some underlying federal right,
immunity, or privilege in order to make a claim against a state
actor.99 When pretrial detainees allege conduct that would
otherwise be categorized as “deliberate indifference” under the
Eighth Amendment, the applicable federal law is the Due Process
Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.100 This states that “[n]o
state shall . . . deprive any person of life, liberty, or property,
without due process of law.”101
Unlike that of the Eighth Amendment, the text of the
Fourteenth Amendment is not restrained to conduct that is
characterized as “punishment.”102 Instead, the scope of
Fourteenth-Amendment due process is broadly focused on the
deprivation of rights, encompassing conduct that “is not rationally
related to a legitimate nonpunitive governmental purpose” or
where it “appear[s] excessive in relation to that purpose.”103

98. See infra notes 99–133 and accompanying text (discussing authority).
99. See supra notes 39–53 and accompanying text (discussing the statute’s
procedural nature).
100. See Redman v. Cnty. of San Diego, 942 F.2d 1435, 1437–39 (9th Cir.
1991) (discussing the application of deliberate indifference to a due-process
claim).
101. U.S. CONST. amend XIV, § 1.
102. See Kingsley v. Hendrickson, 576 U.S. 389, 398 (2015) (rejecting any
requirement “that proof of intent (or motive) to punish is required for a pretrial
detainee to prevail on a claim that his due process rights were violated.”).
103. See id. at 397–98 (comparing the standards of the Eighth Amendment’s
Cruel and Unusual Punishment Clause to that of the Fourteenth Amendment’s
Due Process Clause).
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b. Justifications for Applying Deliberate Indifference Under Due
Process
Various lower courts have applied the Eighth-Amendment
standard—as formulated by the Supreme Court in the context of
prisoners’ claims—to pretrial detainees’ claims of deprivation
under the Due Process Clause.104 Although justifications for this
borrowing exercise vary between the federal circuits, they fall into
two general categories.105 The first is concerned with the
similarities between the two amendments, at least with respect to
the protections they provide to the two classes of plaintiffs and the
types of claims that those plaintiffs bring.106 The second focuses on
the factual issues that courts would purportedly face if pretrial
detainees and prisoners required conflicting treatment for similar
claims.107
(1) Similarities Between the Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments
One general group of justifications proffered by federal courts
for applying the Eighth-Amendment standard is premised on
comparisons between the protections offered by the two
constitutional provisions.108 Specifically, the courts have focused
on either the amendments’ mutual requirement of “evolving
standards,”109 or on the basis that the Eighth Amendment’s
protections act as a “floor” when determining the securities offered
by the Fourteenth.110
104. See infra notes 108–153 and accompanying text (providing an overview
of authority).
105. See infra notes 108–153 and accompanying text (introducing
justifications for applying deliberate indifference).
106. See infra notes 108–122 and accompanying text (providing an overview
of decisions basing their reasoning on the similarities between the two
amendments).
107. See infra notes 123–153 and accompanying text (discussing a decision
applying deliberate indifference due to deferential treatment for corrections
officials).
108. See infra notes 111–159 and accompanying text (discussing a Seventh
Circuit opinion).
109. See infra notes 111–154 and accompanying text (discussing a Ninth
Circuit opinion).
110. See infra notes 118–159 and accompanying text (discussing an Eleventh
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In 1991, the Ninth Circuit heard the appeal of a pretrial
detainee who had been sexually assaulted by his cellmate while
incarcerated.111 He argued that his claim under § 1983 satisfied
the requirement of an underlying constitutional violation because
jail officials had violated his liberty interest in personal security,
which fell under due process.112 In evaluating his claim, the court
applied the Eighth Amendment standard, while acknowledging
that the claim itself fell under the Fourteenth Amendment.113
The court reasoned that this was appropriate because “the
[F]ourteenth [A]mendment, like the [E]ighth [A]mendment, must
draw its meaning from the evolving standards of decency that
mark the progress of a maturing society.”114 This proposition was
made in reference to language used by the Supreme Court.115
However, in the precedential opinion, the Court was only referring
to the acceptability of punishment under the Eighth Amendment,
with no mention of the Fourteenth.116 To eliminate this distinction,
the Ninth Circuit cited similar language in another Supreme Court
case, where the reference was to the Fourteenth Amendment.117
The Seventh Circuit’s use of the Eighth-Amendment standard
also involved a comparison to the Fourteenth, albeit with a slightly
different focus.118 In a case involving the attempted suicide of a
Circuit opinion).
111. See Redman v. Cnty. of San Diego, 942 F.2d 1435, 1437–39 (9th Cir.
1991) (describing the facts and procedural history of the case).
112. See id. at 1439 (describing the nature of the plaintiff’s claim).
113. See id. at 1441 (discussing the proper analysis under a claim requiring
deliberate indifference).
114. See id. (discussing the similar interests driving the analyses of the two
amendments).
115. See id. (stating the standard under which “unnecessary and wanton
infliction of pain” is tied to).
116. See Trop v. Dulles, 356 U.S. 86, 99–100 (1958) (“The basic concept
underlying the Eighth Amendment is nothing less than the dignity of man. While
the State has the power to punish, the Amendment stands to assure that this
power be exercised within the limits of civilized standards.”).
117. See Redman v. Cnty. of San Diego, 942 F.2d 1435, 1441 (9th Cir. 1991)
(“[T]he due process clause is not violated so long as the government conduct is not
repugnant to the conscience of mankind.” (quoting Louisiana ex rel. Francis v.
Resweber, 329 U.S. 459, 471–72 (1947) (Frankfurter, J., concurring))).
118. Compare infra notes 119–156 and accompanying text (outlining the
Eighth Circuit approach), with Redman, 942 F.2d at 1437–39 (describing the
Ninth Circuit’s approach).
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pretrial detainee, the Court applied deliberate indifference
because pretrial detainees’ due process rights “are at least as great
as the Eighth Amendment protection available to a convicted
prisoner.”119 This proposition also referenced an opinion of the
Supreme Court.120 The precedent, however, was not discussing
tests used to determine liability.121 It was simply discussing the
requirement that state actors obtain medical care for persons
injured while being apprehended.122
(2) Factual Considerations
Another justification proffered by courts in applying the
Eighth-Amendment standard is based on practical concerns.123
Essentially, the application of different standards would require
courts to afford different protections to plaintiffs who have been
held under identical conditions.124
In 1985, the Eleventh Circuit heard the appeal of George
Hamm, who was challenging the constitutionality of various
conditions at the DeKalb County, Georgia jail.125 His claims arose
during two different time periods.126 During the first, he was yet to
119. See Hall v. Ryan, 957 F.2d 402, 405 (7th Cir. 1992) (noting that the
Eighth Amendment standard should apply despite the fact that “pre-trial
detainees cannot be punished because they have not yet been found guilty . . .”).
120. See id. (citing Supreme Court precedents that hold the rights of pretrial
detainees to be at least as great as those of a convicted prisoner).
121. See Revere v. Mass. Gen. Hosp., 463 U.S. 239, 244–45 (1983) (“We need
not define, in this case, Revere’s due process obligation to pretrial detainees or to
other persons in its care who require medical attention.”).
122. See id. (“Whatever the standard may be, Revere fulfilled its
constitutional obligation by seeing that Kivlin was taken promptly to a hospital
that provided the treatment necessary for his injury.”).
123. See infra notes 131–168 and accompanying text (stating that courts
would essentially have to split hairs, depending on the status of the plaintiff).
124. See infra notes 131–168 and accompanying text (discussing the
reasoning of the Eleventh Circuit).
125. See Hamm v. DeKalb Cnty., 774 F.2d 1567, 1569 (11th Cir. 1985)
(“[Hamm] alleged that the jail was overcrowded, that the conditions were
unsanitary, that the food service was unsanitary, and that the medical care was
inadequate.”).
126. See id. (“The parties agree that the periods of incarceration pertinent to
this appeal are February 11, 1980 to April 14, 1980 and September 23, 1980 to
May 20, 1981. These periods of incarceration include periods both before and after
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be convicted and thus was afforded the status of pretrial
detainee.127 During the second period, he was being held
post-conviction, shifting his status to that of a prisoner.128 Because
of this context, the Court grappled with the possibility that the
analyses of his claims could differ because one was under the
Fourteenth Amendment, while the other was under the Eighth.129
This was further complicated by an earlier Supreme Court decision
that had made it clear that conduct that amounts to “punishment”
is a violation of a detainee’s due process guarantees—a clear
difference from the constitutional permissibility for conduct
alleged by prisoners.130
Ultimately, the Court decided that there should be no
difference between the analyses of the two amendments.131 The
conclusion was premised on the reality that many facilities hold
both pretrial detainees and convicted inmates, such as the DeKalb
County Jail.132 By requiring different standards, courts would
essentially have to split hairs between claims, depending on the
status of the plaintiff.133

Hamm’s conviction.”).
127. See id. at 1572 (discussing Hamm’s status before his conviction).
128. See id. (“The eighth amendment, however, applies only to confinement
that occurs subsequent to and as a consequence of a person’s lawful conviction of
a crime.”).
129. See id. (“Since the conditions about which Hamm complains in this case
were imposed on him both before and after his conviction . . . this court must
determine the extent to which [Eighth Amendment] standards differ—if any—
from due process standards.”).
130. See id. at 1572–73 (“The due process clause affords pretrial detainees
rights not enjoyed by convicted inmates.” (quoting Jones v. Diamond, 636 F.2d
1364, 1368 (5th Cir. 1981) (en banc)).
131. See Hamm v. DeKalb Cnty., 774 F.2d 1567, 1574 (11th Cir. 1985) (“The
court recognizes that the limitations imposed by the eighth amendment and the
due process clause arise in different contexts. Nonetheless, with respect to the
provision of basic necessities to individuals in the state’s custody, the two
provisions necessarily yield the same result.”).
132. See id. (discussing the practical implications of using two different
standards).
133. See id. (“That approach would result in the courts’ becoming enmeshed
in the minutiae of prison operations, a situation against which the Supreme Court
has warned.”).

GIVING DUE PROCESS ITS DUE

671

III. The Effect of Kingsley v. Hendrickson
In 2015 the Supreme Court made it clear that
Eighth-Amendment standards do not necessarily apply to pretrial
detainees’ claims.134 The decision itself was not concerned with a
conditions-of-confinement claim.135 However, some federal courts
have viewed the reasoning in that opinion as being equally
applicable to those claims.136 As a result, they have eliminated
deliberate indifference as a requirement for pretrial detainees and
replaced it with an objective standard.137 Other courts have
declined to extend the reasoning, creating a split among the federal
circuits.138 This Part discusses the reasoning that led to the
Supreme Court’s decision and the resulting disagreement among
some federal Courts of Appeals.
A. Kingsley v. Hendrickson
In 2015 the Supreme Court heard the appeal of a pretrial
detainee’s excessive-force claim under 42 U.S.C. § 1983.139 The
question presented was whether the Fourteenth Amendment’s
guarantee of due process requires a plaintiff to prove that
corrections officers “were subjectively aware that their use of force
[against the plaintiff] was unreasonable, or only that the officers’
use of force was objectively unreasonable.”140 The Court held in
134. See Kingsley v. Hendrickson, 576 U.S. 389, 400 (2015) (contrasting
claims on the basis of the underlying federal rights that apply).
135. See id. at 395 (“Kingsley filed a petition for certiorari asking us to
determine whether the requirements of a § 1983 excessive force claim brought by
a pretrial detainee must satisfy the subjective standard or only the objective
standard.”).
136. See infra notes 175–238 and accompanying text (discussing opinions that
see the reasoning in Kingsley as generally applicable to pretrial detainees’
claims).
137. See infra notes 175–238 and accompanying text (discussing opinions that
have applied an objective unreasonableness standard to pretrial detainees’
conditions-of-confinement claims).
138. See infra notes 232–264 and accompanying text (discussing opinions that
have narrowly defined Kingsley’s reasoning).
139. See Kingsley v. Hendrickson, 576 U.S. 389, 391 (2015) (providing the
procedural posture of the case and framing the question before the Court).
140. Id.
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favor of the plaintiff, finding that “objective unreasonableness” was
the appropriate standard for determining whether the force used
pierced the constitutional threshold of excessiveness.141
An excessive force claim is not the same thing as a claim
requiring a showing of deliberate indifference—the focus of this
Note—even though they both apply to pretrial detainees.142
Nevertheless, the Court’s reasoning has major implications for the
blind application of Eighth-Amendment doctrine to claims brought
under the Fourteenth.143
1. Background
In April 2010, Michael Kingsley was arrested and booked into
the Monroe County Jail in Sparta, Wisconsin.144 At some point
during his time in custody, Kingsley was transferred to a cell
where a prior occupant had affixed a piece of paper to a light in
order to dim its brightness.145 On the evening of May 20 and in the
early morning of May 21, officers at the jail ordered him to remove
the paper from the light.146 Kingsley refused to remove the paper
because he had not placed it there.147
141. See id. at 396 (“In deciding whether the force used is, constitutionally
speaking, ‘excessive,’ should courts use an objective standard only, or instead a
subjective standard that takes into account a defendant’s state of mind? It is with
respect to this question that we must hold that courts must use an objective
standard.”).
142. Compare Graham v. Connor, 490 U.S. 386, 392 (1989) (referring to the
type of violation alleged in a pretrial detainee’s excessive force claim as
“physically abusive government conduct”), with Castro v. Cnty. of L.A., 833 F.3d
1060, 1068 (9th Cir. 2016) (“[T]he ‘deliberate indifference’ standard applies to
claims that corrections facility officials failed to address the medical needs of
pretrial detainees.” (quoting Clouthier v. Cnty. of Contra Costa, 591 F.3d 1232,
1242 (9th Cir. 2010), overruled by Castro v. Cnty. of L.A., 833 F.3d 1060, 1060
(9th Cir. 2016))).
143. See infra notes 171–174 and accompanying text (discussing a circuit
split).
144. Brief for Petitioner at 3, Kingsley v. Hendrickson, 576 U.S. 389 (2015)
(No. 14–6368) (“[Kingsley] was being detained pending trial at the time of the
incident that rise to his excessive force claim.”).
145. See id. at 4 n.2 (“[T]he paper in his cell was already there when he was
transferred to that cell about a month earlier. As the court below noted, inmates
cover the light with paper to dim the brightness of the light.”).
146. See id. at 4 (summarizing the events that led to litigation).
147. See id. (explaining the officers’ reasoning for moving Mr. Kingsley from
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The officers entered Kingsley’s cell and placed him in
handcuffs before roughly moving him to a receiving cell “so that
jail staff could remove the paper.”148 Although the parties disputed
the exact events that occurred in the receiving cell, it is undeniable
that a senior officer directed another to use a taser on Kingsley,
who was lying “face down on a cement bunk with his hands still
cuffed behind his back.”149 After applying the taser for
approximately five seconds, the officers left without removing the
handcuffs.150
Kingsley filed an action in the district court under § 1983,
claiming that the officers had used excessive force against him in
violation of his Fourteenth-Amendment right to due process as a
pretrial detainee.151 Ultimately, a jury found in favor of the
defendants.152 Kingsley took issue with the jury instructions and
appealed his case to the Seventh Circuit.153
his cell).
148. See id.
To accomplish [the transfer], the officers first entered Mr. Kingsley’s
cell and handcuffed him behind his back while he was lying face down
on his bunk. Mr. Kingsley testified that the handcuffs were extremely
tight. During the transfer, the officers banged Mr. Kingsley’s leg
against the bunk in picking him up, causing pain in his foot and
making it difficult for him to walk. The officers then carried Mr.
Kingsley from to original cell to the receiving cell.
149. See id. at 5 (stating that Sergeant Hendrickson, a named party in the
ensuing litigation, “placed his knee on Mr. Kingsley’s back” while he was “face
down on a cement bunk with his hands still cuffed behind his back.”).
150. See Brief for Petitioner, supra note 144, at 5 (“Other officers were later
able to remove Mr. Kingsley’s handcuffs without incident.”).
151. See Kingsley v. Hendrickson, 576 U.S. 389, 393 (2015) (stating that the
claim proceeded to trial after the district court denied the officers’ motion for
summary judgment because “a reasonable jury could conclude that the officers
acted with malice and intended to harm Kingsley when they used excessive force
against him.” (quoting Kingsley v. Josvai, No. 10–cv–832–bbc, 2011 U.S. Dist.
LEXIS 158769, at *18 (W.D. Wis. Nov. 16, 2011), aff’d 744 F.3d 443 (7th Cir.
2014), rev’d 135 S. Ct. 2466 (2015))).
152. Id. at 394.
153. See id. (summarizing the events that led to Kingsley’s appeal); see also
Joint Appendix at 278, Kingsley v. Hendrickson, 576 U.S. 389 (2015), for the jury
instructions used in the district court, which state in pertinent part:
In deciding whether one or more of the defendants used “unreasonable”
force against the plaintiff, you must consider whether it was
unreasonable harm from the perspective of a reasonable officer facing
the same circumstances that defendants faced. You must base the
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His argument was based on the jury instructions’ requirement
that liability could only be found if the defendants had actual
knowledge that their conduct created an unnecessary risk of harm
to the plaintiff.154 A majority of the court of appeals panel, however,
found that liability required a “subjective inquiry into the officer’s
state of mind.”155 Still in disagreement with this legal standard,
Kingsley petitioned for and was granted certiorari by the Supreme
Court.156
2. The Supreme Court’s Opinion
In a majority opinion authored by Stephen Breyer, the
Supreme Court agreed with Kingsley’s contention that a subjective
standard is inappropriate for a pretrial detainee’s excessive force
claim.157 Though constitutional claims for excessive force differ
from those for deliberate indifference,158 the reasons for which the
Court arrived at its conclusion create implications for both.159

decision based on what the defendants knew at the time of the incident,
not based on what you know now.
(emphasis added).
154. See id. (“On appeal, Kingsley argued that the correct standard for
judging a pretrial detainee’s excessive force claim is objective
unreasonableness.”).
155. See id. (stating that the majority panel found that “[t]here must be an
actual intent to violate the plaintiff’s rights or reckless disregard for his rights.”
(quoting Kingsley v. Hendrickson, 744 F.3d 443, 451 (7th Cir. 2014), rev’d 576
U.S. 389 (2015))).
156. See id. at 395 (stating that the petition for certiorari was granted “in
light of disagreement among the Circuits.”).
157. See Kingsley v. Hendrickson, 576 U.S. 389, 395 (2015) (“We conclude
with respect to that question that the appropriate standard is objective not
subjective. Thus, the defendant’s state of mind is not a matter that the plaintiff
is required to prove.”).
158. Compare Kingsley v. Hendrickson, 744 F.3d 443, 448 (7th Cir. 2014) (“A
claim of excessive force, like the one at issue here, is, at bottom, one that seeks to
impose liability for physically abusive government conduct.”), rev’d 576 U.S. 389
(2015), with Alderson v. Concordia Par. Corr. Facility, 848 F.3d 415, 419 (5th Cir.
2017) (per curiam) (applying the deliberate indifference standard where a pretrial
detainee alleged that corrections officials “provided him inadequate security and
impermissibly delayed medical care”).
159. See infra notes 171–174 and accompanying text (discussing a circuit
split).
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Justice Breyer began by framing the “state of mind issue” in
dispute between the parties.160 While there was no dispute over the
defendants’ volition with respect to their physical acts, the proper
inquiry on appeal was into their recognition of whether or not those
acts were “excessive.”161 In determining the appropriate question,
Justice Breyer made it clear that negligence—an impermissible
standard for substantive due process claims—is inapplicable only
with respect to the defendants’ volitional acts, not their
interpretation of the acts’ consequences.162
After quickly concluding that objective unreasonableness is a
permissible standard for judging a defendant’s state of mind,
Breyer noted that the application was partly due to the
constitutional differences between convicted prisoners and pretrial
detainees.163 The defendants argued that precedent supported the
position that some form of intent was required for § 1983
liability.164 Breyer reminded them, however, that the authority
cited concerned litigation brought by convicted prisoners.165 Where
the Eighth Amendment is placed as the substantive anchor of a
160. See Kingsley, 576 U.S. at 395 (“We consider a legally requisite state of
mind. In a case like this one, there are, in a sense, two separate state-of-mind
questions.”).
161. See id. at 396
[T]he officers do not dispute that they acted purposefully or knowingly
with respect to the force they used against Kingsley. We now consider
the question before us here—the defendant’s state of mind with respect
to the proper interpretation of the force (a series of events in the world)
that the defendant deliberately (not accidently or negligently) used. In
deciding whether the force used is, constitutionally speaking,
“excessive,” should courts use an objective standard only, or instead a
subjective standard that takes into account a defendant’s state of
mind?
162. See id. (“Thus, if an officer’s Taser goes off by accident or if an officer
unintentionally trips and falls on a detainee, causing him harm, the pretrial
detainee cannot prevail on an excessive force claim.”).
163. See Kingsley v. Hendrickson, 576 U.S. 389, 397 (2015) (drawing a
distinction between the respective positions that pretrial detainees and convicted
prisoners stand in).
164. See id. at 400 (“Respondents believe that the relevant legal standard
should be subjective, i.e., that the plaintiff must prove that the use of force . . . was
applied ‘maliciously and sadistically to cause harm.”).
165. See id. (“The first of these two of these cases, however, concern excessive
force claims brought by convicted prisoners under the Eighth Amendment’s Cruel
and Unusual Punishment Clause, not claims brought by pretrial detainees under
the Fourteenth Amendment’s Due Process Clause.”).

676

27 WASH. & LEE J. CIV. RTS. & SOC. JUST. 649 (2021)

§ 1983 claim, constitutionally impermissible punishment is a
required element of the claim.166
Unlike prisoners, pretrial detainees’ claims are not premised
on whether or not they were unconstitutionally punished.167 “The
language of the two clauses differs, and the nature of the claims
often differs.”168 Under the Court’s jurisprudence, detainees
“cannot be punished at all, much less ‘maliciously and
sadistically.”169 Therefore, the element of intent that is inherently
required for claims under the Cruel and Unusual Punishment
Clause does not apply to pretrial detainees’ Due Process claims.170
B. The Consequences of Kingsley v. Hendrickson
Although the Supreme Court’s decision was limited to pretrial
detainees’ excessive force claims,171 the case has presented a
substantial issue for lower courts to consider.172 At its most basic
distillation, the question seems simple enough: Should a purely
objective analysis into a corrections official’s state of mind be
confined only to excessive force claims, or should it apply to a
broader range of claims brought by pretrial detainees under the
Fourteenth Amendment?173 Courts have come down on both sides

166. See id. at 401 (“Thus, there is no need here, as there might be in an
Eighth Amendment case, to determine when punishment is unconstitutional.”).
167. See id. (explaining the inherent differences between the
Fourteenth-Amendment claims of pretrial detainees and the Eight-Amendment
claims of convicted prisoners).
168. Kingsley v. Hendrickson, 576 U.S. 389, 400 (2015).
169. See id. (“If the offence be not bailable, or the party cannot find bail, he is
committed to the county jail[,] but only for safe custody, and not for punishment.”
(quoting 4 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES *298, *300)).
170. See id. (“And, most importantly, pretrial detainees (unlike convicted
prisoners) cannot be punished at all, much less ‘maliciously and sadistically.”
(quoting Ingraham v. Wright, 430 U.S. 651, 671–72, n.40 (1977))).
171. See id. at 402 (“We acknowledge that our view that an objective standard
is appropriate in the context of excessive force claims brought by pretrial
detainees pursuant to the Fourteenth Amendment . . . .”).
172. See Castro v. Cnty. of L.A., 833 F.3d 1060, 1068–69 (9th Cir. 2016)
(discussing lower courts’ treatment of the issue).
173. See id. (“Kingsley did not squarely address the objective standard applies
to all kinds of claims brought by pretrial detainees, including both excessive force
claims and failure-to-protect claims.”).
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of the issue.174 This subpart provides an overview of the split by
discussing individual cases. Those that have expanded Kingsley’s
application will be considered first, followed by opinions that have
confined Kingsley’s reach to excessive-force claims.
1. Expanding Kingsley to a Broader Range of Claims
a. The Second Circuit
In 2017, the Second Circuit Court of Appeals heard the case of
twenty pretrial detainees who brought an action alleging that the
City of New York, the New York Police Department, and individual
officers had subjected them to “appalling conditions of
confinement” at Brooklyn Central Booking.175 The issue was
whether the district court properly granted the defendants’ motion
for summary judgment on the basis that the plaintiffs could not
establish the “subjective prong” of a deliberate indifference
analysis.176 The court noted that its own precedent had settled on
applying only a subjective standard.177 However, it also recognized
that the use of a subjective requirement was no longer on steady
ground in light of Kingsley and questioned whether a purely
objective requirement is the proper standard.178
The court began its analysis by noting that, despite what the
term itself may suggest, “deliberate indifference” is not inherently
174. Compare infra notes 175–231 and accompanying text (extending the
application to a broader range of pretrial detainees’ due process claims), with
infra notes 232–257 and accompanying text (declining to extend the application
beyond pretrial detainees’ excessive force claims).
175. See Darnell v. Pineiro, 849 F.3d 17, 20 (2d Cir. 2017) (“This is a case
about unconstitutional conditions of confinement for pretrial detainees.”).
176. See id. at 20–21 (“[N]or could any plaintiff establish that . . . the
individual defendants were actually aware of any dangerous conditions, or that
the individual defendants acted unreasonably in responding to any such
conditions; nor, for similar reasons, could the plaintiffs establish that the
individual defendants acted with punitive intent.”).
177. See id. at 33 (discussing the resolution of an intra-circuit divergence with
respect to the treatment of the deliberate indifference standard).
178. See id. at 21 (“The District Court did not analyze the implications of
Kingsley in its opinion . . . [t]his case also requires us to consider whether
Kingsley altered the standard for conditions of confinement claims under the
Fourteenth Amendment’s Due Process Clause.”).
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a standard that requires some subjective inquiry.179 Because its
definition is somewhat flexible, deliberate indifference requires a
general state-of-mind inquiry, but there is no need for the inquiry
to be subjective.180 This interpretation was strengthened by
recognizing that Supreme Court precedent demanding a subjective
inquiry came under the Eighth Amendment, where “punishment
connotes a subjective intent on the part of the official.”181
The court further distanced the doctrine of the Eighth and
Fourteenth Amendments by looking to the language of Kingsley.182
Noting that “pretrial detainees cannot be punished at all, much
less ‘maliciously and sadistically,” it found no basis in its prior
opinions supporting the conclusion that deliberate indifference
should apply equally to claims under both amendments.183 Instead,
the court found that the deliberate indifference analysis only
requires the plaintiff to prove that the defendant objectively failed
to appreciate the risks that led to the plaintiff’s injury.184 While the
defendants argued that this would result in a dramatic increase in
litigation, the court noted that its previous decision to do away
with the objective standard was premised on consistency with the
Supreme Court, not on considerations of judicial efficiency.185
179. See id. at 29 (“[T]he Supreme Court has instructed that ‘deliberate
indifference’ roughly means ‘recklessness,’ but ‘recklessness’ can be defined
subjectively (what a person actually knew, or disregarded), or objectively (what a
reasonable person knew, or should have known).” (citing Farmer v. Brennan, 511
U.S. 825, 836–37 (1994))).
180. See id. at 32 (“As such, the ‘subjective prong’ might better be described
as the ‘mens rea prong’, or ‘mental element prong.”).
181. See Darnell, 849 F.3d at 32–33 (“The Supreme Court based its holding
on a close reading of the text of the Cruel and Unusual Punishments Clause,
which outlaws ‘cruel and unusual punishments,’ not ‘cruel and unusual
conditions.” (emphasis added) (quoting Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S. 825, 837
(1994)).
182. See id. at 33–34 (revisiting the rationale in Kingsley).
183. See id. at 34–35
Unlike a violation of the Cruel and Unusual Punishments Clause, an
official can violate the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth
Amendment without meting out any punishment, which means that
the Due Process Clause can be violated when an official does not have
subjective awareness that the official’s acts (or omissions) have
subjected the pretrial detainee to a substantial risk of harm.
184. See id. at 34 (“In other words, the ‘subjective prong’ (or ‘mens rea prong’)
of a deliberate indifference claim is defined objectively.”).
185. See id. at 36 (stating that the initial decision to use an objective standard
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b. The Seventh Circuit
In 2012, Lyvita Gomes died under the care of corrections staff
in Lake County, Illinois.186 Before passing away, Gomes refused to
eat or drink while “[t]he medical providers who worked at the Jail
did little other than monitoring as she wasted away in her cell.”187
The personal representative of her estate brought an action
against Correct Care Solutions, a contractor providing medical
services to the jail’s population.188 The claim theorized that the
decision to monitor Gomes in lieu of transporting her to a hospital
constituted
inadequate
medical
care
with
deliberate
189
indifference. Upon motion by the defendants, the district court
granted judgment as a matter of law on the constitutional
claims.190
On appeal, the Seventh Circuit discussed the proper
application of deliberate indifference to claims of inadequate
medical care.191 Authority within the circuit required a showing
that the defendant actually believed that the plaintiff was faced
with a significant risk of harm.192 However, the court
acknowledged that this was decided without any analysis of the
differences that exist between pretrial detainees and convicted
prisoners.193
was not “because of any concerns that an objective standard would prompt the
filing of non-meritorious claims”).
186. See Miranda v. Cnty. of Lake, 900 F.3d 335, 342 (7th Cir. 2018) (“The
autopsy opined that she died of Complications of Dehydration and Starvation.
The manner of death was suicide.”).
187. See id. at 341–42 (describing the acts and omissions taken by jail staff
and medical providers who oversaw the care of Ms. Gomes during her
incarceration).
188. See id. at 341 (summarizing the litigation that led to the appeal in the
Seventh Circuit).
189. See id. 346–47 (identifying two physicians as defendants to the estate’s
due process claim).
190. See id. at 343 (“The court also concluded that the Estate had failed to
present enough evidence to reach the jury on the question of whether the medical
defendants causes Gomes’s death . . . .”).
191. See id. at 350–51 (analyzing the “intent” requirement for claims of
deliberate indifference).
192. See id. at 351 (“This subjective standard is closely linked to the language
of the Eighth Amendment, which prohibits ‘cruel and unusual punishments.’”).
193. See id. at 350–51 (“In conducting this borrowing exercise, we have
grafted the Eighth Amendment’s deliberate indifference requirement onto the
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The court emphasized that Kingsley v. Hendrickson was
brought under the Fourteenth Amendment.194 It noted that the
Supreme Court’s decision rested on that fact, especially with
regard to the “punishment” issue.195 While prisoners have a right
to be free from “cruel and unusual punishment,” detainees have a
right to be free from punishment generally.196 Acts that constitute
“punishment” of pretrial detainees may include that of the “cruel
and unusual” variety, which requires “an express intent to
punish.”197 Although this calls for a subjective inquiry, it is only
one area within a broader range of conduct considered punishment
when pretrial detainees are involved.198
Kingsley’s definition of punishment in the pretrial context led
the court to “call into question” its practice of “treating the
protections afforded by the Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments
as ‘functionally indistinguishable’ in the context of a claim about
inadequate medical care.”199 Noting that “the Supreme Court has
been signaling that courts must pay careful attention to the
different status of pretrial detainees” in opinions other than
Kingsley, the court found no valid reason for confining the
elimination of a subjective standard only to excessive-force
claims.200 Consequently, the court concluded that “objective
pretrial detainee’s situation.”).
194. See id. at 351 (“Kingsley, it is worth emphasizing, was a Fourteenth
Amendment Due Process case. Indeed, the Court took pains to reiterate the basic
principles that apply to pretrial detainees . . . .”).
195. See id. (discussing the Majority opinion in Kingsley v. Hendrickson).
196. See id. (noting that “the Due Process Clause protects a pretrial detainee
from the use of excessive force that amounts to punishment” (quoting Graham v.
Connor, 490 U.S. 386, 395 n.10 (1989))).
197. See id. (discussing the Supreme Court’s treatment of “punishment” by
government actors in the pretrial context).
198. See id. (“[I]n the absence of an expressed intent to punish, a pretrial
detainee can nevertheless prevail by showing that the actions are not ‘rationally
related to a legitimate nonpunitive government purpose’ or that the actions
‘appear excessive in relation to that purpose.” (emphasis omitted) (quoting Bell v.
Wolfish, 441 U.S. 520, 561 (1979))).
199. See id. at 352 (discussing the grafting of Eighth Amendment principles
to claims brought under the Fourteenth Amendment within the Seventh Circuit
and among other federal Courts of Appeal) (quoting Smego v. Jumper, 707 F.
App’x 411, 412 (7th Cir. 2017))).
200. See id. (“We see nothing in the logic the Supreme Court used in Kingsley
that would support this kind of dissection of the different types of claims that
arise under the Fourteenth Amendment’s Due Process Clause.”).
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unreasonableness” is the proper state-of-mind requirement for
pretrial detainees’ inadequate medical care claims.201
c. The Ninth Circuit
In 2009, Jonathan Castro was arrested for public drunkenness
and transported to a police station in West Hollywood,
California.202 There, he was placed in a sobering cell designed “to
allow maximum visual supervision” by corrections staff.203
Sometime later, Jonathan Gonzalez was arrested and placed into
the cell with Castro.204 During his arrest and intake, Gonzalez was
described as “combative” and his behavior characterized as
“bizarre.”205 Despite a California law calling for jail staff to
maintain “maximum visual supervision” of “inmates requiring
more than minimum security,” vision into the cell was partially
blocked, and the detainees were supervised by an unpaid
volunteer.206
Castro pounded on the cell’s window shortly after Gonzalez
entered, but the volunteer did not check on them for another
twenty minutes.207 Upon observing Gonzalez “inappropriately
touching Castro’s thigh,” the volunteer did not enter to
investigate.208 Instead, he reported to the station’s supervising
officer, who arrived six minutes later to witness Gonzalez violently

201. See id. (stating the appropriate state-of-mind requirement for
inadequate medical care claims and identifying other federal courts that have
used the same application).
202. See Castro v. Cnty. of L.A., 833 F.3d 1060, 1064–65 (9th Cir. 2016) (en
banc) (describing the circumstances of Castro’s arrest).
203. See id. at 1065 (describing a “sobering cell” as “a fully walled chamber
that was stripped of objects with hard edges on which an inmate could hurt
himself; the cell contained only a toilet and some mattress pads”).
204. See id. (“[A]uthorities arrested Gonzalez on a felony charge after he
shattered a glass door with his fist at a nightclub.”).
205. See id. (describing the account of Gonzalez’s arrival at the West
Hollywood station as recorded on an intake form).
206. See id. (“The sobering cell met neither of these requirements, yet it was
used routinely.”).
207. See id. (describing the events that led to Castro’s injury).
208. See id. (noting that “Castro appeared to be asleep” and that Gonzalez’s
action was “in violation of jail policy”).
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stomping on Castro’s head.209 After the incident, Castro was
hospitalized for nearly a month and required care in a long-term
facility for four years.210 “He suffers from severe memory loss and
other cognitive difficulties.”211
Castro filed multiple claims against Los Angeles County, the
Sheriff’s Department, and individual defendants.212 Among these
was a failure-to-protect claim under the Fourteenth Amendment,
which required a showing of deliberate indifference.213 After a jury
returned a verdict favorable to Castro, the defendants appealed to
the Ninth Circuit on the basis that this conclusion was not
reasonable in light of the evidence presented.214
The Ninth Circuit, sitting en banc, tackled the deliberate
indifference analysis by first noting that its precedent, requiring a
subjective inquiry, was premised on an interpretation of Supreme
Court opinions that seemed to suggest that “punitive intent” is a
requirement the plaintiff must prove.215 The court then quickly
discussed the impact of Kingsley v. Hendrickson before concluding
that the decision directly contradicted its prior treatment of the
issue.216 However, it also recognized that the Supreme Court was
209. See id. (stating that the station supervisor “found Castro lying
unconscious in a pool of blood”).
210. See id. (“When paramedics arrived, Castro was unconscious, in
respiratory distress, and blue.”).
211. See id. (describing the ongoing effects of Castro’s injuries).
212. See id. (“Castro claimed that both the entity defendants and the
individual defendants violated his constitutional rights by housing him in the
sobering cell with Gonzalez and by failing to maintain appropriate supervision of
the cell.”).
213. See id. at 1067 (“[T]he Supreme Court made clear that ‘prison officials
have a duty to protect prisoners from violence at the hands of other prisoners’
because corrections officers ‘have stripped the inmates of virtually every means
of self-protection and foreclosed their access to outside aid.” (quoting Farmer v.
Brennan, 511 U.S. 825, 833 (1994))).
214. See id. (“A three-judge panel affirmed the judgment of the district court
as to the individual defendants but reversed as to the entity defendants. A
majority of active non-recused judges voted to rehear the case en banc.”).
215. See id. at 1068 (“[W]e held that ‘an official’s failure to alleviate a
significant risk that he should have perceived but did not, while no cause for
commendation, cannot be condemned as infliction of punishment,’ and so could
not support liability under either the Eighth or Fourteenth Amendment.”
(quoting Clouthier v. Cnty. of Contra Costa, 591 F.3d 1232, 1242 (9th Cir. 2010),
overruled by Castro v. Cnty. of L.A., 833 F.3d 1060 (9th Cir. 2016) (en banc))).
216. See id. at 1068–69 (“In sum, Kingsley rejected the notion that there exists
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less than crystal clear as to whether the objective standard should
be applied beyond excessive-force claims.217
The court ultimately found ample support for expansion.218
First, it noted that the “state-of-mind” requirement is not attached
to the statute that allows the court to hear the action, but rather
to the underlying federal right that the plaintiff claims has been
violated.219 Whether a pretrial detainee brings an excessive-force
claim or a failure-to-protect claim, the underlying federal right is
due process under the Fourteenth Amendment.220 This, of course,
differs from convicted prisoners, who rely on the Cruel and
Unusual Punishment Clause, which requires a subjective
standard.221
The court also noted that Kingsley’s choice of language
supports a broader application of the objective standard.222 The
Supreme Court could have stated that pretrial detainees can
provide purely objective evidence of a defendant’s state of mind
with respect to the level of force applied.223 Instead, it stated that
such evidence can be brought with respect to a “challenged
government action.”224
After deciding that Kingsley’s state-of-mind requirement
covers a broad range of claims, the court found that this includes
a single ‘deliberate indifference’ standard applicable to all § 1983 claims, whether
brought by pretrial detainees or by convicted prisoners.”).
217. See id. at 1069 (“An excessive force claim, like the one at issue in
Kingsley, differs in some ways from a failure-to-protect claim, like the one at issue
here.”).
218. See id. at 1069–70 (“On the other hand, there are significant reasons to
hold that the objective standard applies to failure-to-protect claims as well.”).
219. See id. at 1069 (“Section 1983 itself contains no state-of-mind
requirement independent of necessary to state a violation of the underlying
federal right.” (quoting Bd. of Cnty. Comm’rs of Bryan Cty. v. Brown, 520 U.S.
397, 405 (1997))).
220. See id. (discussing the relationship between different categories of claims
that may be brought by pretrial detainees).
221. See id. at 1070 (“And, most importantly, pretrial detainees (unlike
convicted prisoners) cannot be punished at all, much less maliciously and
sadistically.” (quoting Kingsley v. Hendrickson, 135 S. Ct. 2466, 2475 (2015))).
222. See id. (“We note, too, the broad wording of Kingsley.”).
223. See id. (noting that Kingsley v. Hendrickson rejected the interpretation
of precedent on which the Ninth Circuit previously relied).
224. See id. (“The Court did not limit its holding to force but spoke to the
challenged government action generally.”).
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failure-to-protect claims.225 In applying the standard to these
claims, the court proposed a concrete set of elements.226 The first
two require that the defendant created a condition that subjected
the detainee to a significant risk of harm.227 Like the decision to
use force as described in Kingsley, this requires some measure of
intent on the part of the defendant, and thus calls for a subjective
inquiry.228 The third element requires that the defendant did not
take any reasonably available measures to abate the risk
created.229 Like the defendant’s cognizance of whether or not the
force used was “excessive” in Kingsley, this may be decided from
the view of a reasonable person.230 Therefore, the failure to abate
the risk of harm may be demonstrated on the basis that it was
objectively unreasonable.231
2. Confining Kingsley to Excessive-Force Claims
Three federal courts of appeals have decided that Kingsley’s
application of an objective standard to excessive-force claims
should not be expanded to claims requiring deliberate
indifference.232 These courts’ actual consideration of Kingsley’s
225. See id. (“Excessive force applied directly by an individual jailer and force
applied by a fellow inmate can cause the same injuries, both physical and
constitutional.”).
226. See id. at 1071 (reciting the elements required for a pretrial detainee to
prove a failure-to-protect claim).
227. See id. at 1070–71 (applying the principles of Kingsley v. Hendrickson to
a failure-to-protect claim).
228. See id. (“In the failure-to-protect context, in which the issue is usually
inaction rather than action, the equivalent is that the officer’s conduct with
respect to the plaintiff was intentional.”).
229. See id. (“Was there a substantial risk of serious harm to the plaintiff that
could have been eliminated through reasonable and available measures that the
officer did not take, thus causing the injury that the plaintiff suffered?”).
230. See id. at 1071 (“Thus, the test to be applied under Kingsley must require
a pretrial detainee who asserts a due process claim for failure to protect to prove
more than negligence but less than subjective intent—something akin to reckless
disregard.”).
231. See id. (“The defendant did not take reasonable measures to abate that
risk, even though a reasonable officer in the same circumstances would have
appreciated the high degree of risk involved—making the consequences of the
defendant’s conduct obvious . . . .”).
232. See infra notes 235–257 and accompanying text (discussing judicial
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potential ramifications is perhaps best summarized by Judge Van
Tatenhove of the Eastern District of Kentucky, who stated that
“each of these cases contains a dearth of reasoning.”233 What little
reasoning there is can be placed in two different categories, each
to be considered in turn.234
a. Kingsley Involved a Different Type of Conduct
The first is not really a reason for cabining Kingsley to
excessive-force claims so much as it is a simple assertion that it
has been.235 In 2014, Norman Whitney, Jr., was placed in the
medical unit of the St. Louis City Justice Center because he
suffered from a number of serious medical conditions.236 In
addition, Whitney, Jr., had pleaded with officers to kill him upon
his initial arrest.237 Shelley Sharp, a corrections officer, was tasked
with monitoring him on a closed-circuit television.238 During a
fourteen-minute span where she failed to do so, Whitney, Jr.,
hanged himself.239
Whitney’s father filed a § 1983 claim alleging that Sharp failed
to adequately monitor his son.240 The district court dismissed the
complaint and the case was appealed to the Eighth Circuit.241
There, the court found “that the complaint fails to allege facts
establishing the subjective prong of the deliberate indifference
opinions that have rejected the notion that an objective standard should apply to
a broader range of pretrial detainees’ due-process claims).
233. See Love v. Franklin Cnty., 376 F. Supp. 3d 740, 746 (E.D. Ky. 2019)
(“Continued use of the subjective test in other circuits is similarly
unpersuasive.”).
234. See infra notes 235–257 and accompanying text (discussing the reasons
given for rejecting a broader application of Kingsley’s objective standard).
235. See Love, 376 F. Supp. 3d at 746 (dismissing the Eight Circuit’s opinion
on Kingsley’s consequence to pretrial detainees deliberate-indifference claims as
an “assertion without reason.”).
236. Whitney v. City of St. Louis, 887 F.3d 857, 859 (8th Cir. 2018).
237. See id. (“He was evaluated and determined to be suicidal.”).
238. See id. (explaining that his cell was monitored by closed-circuit
television).
239. See id. (finding that the suicide occurred when Whitney Jr. was not being
monitored).
240. See id. (bringing the charge in Missouri state court).
241. See id. at 859–60 (appealing two separate district court rulings).
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claim.”242 In a footnote it acknowledged Whitney, Sr.’s assertion
that Kingsley called for the application of an objective standard.243
The full response to this assertion was “Kingsley does not control
because it was an excessive force case, not a deliberate indifference
case.” 244
b. Circuit Precedent
The second reason offered for rejecting a broader application
of Kingsley involves two circuits’ rules for rejecting their own
precedent.245 The first case involved Nam Dang, a detainee who
filed a suit for inadequate medical care after health care providers
in the Seminole County, Florida jail failed to diagnose him with
meningitis, despite his complaints of a headache and the presence
of objectively identifiable symptoms.246 On appeal, the Eleventh
Circuit noted that the application of an objective standard would
not make the individual defendants liable because their conduct
was merely negligent.247
However, the court went even further by rejecting the
application of Kingsley’s objective standard altogether, finding
that this would be barred by its own precedent that adopted
deliberate indifference.248 This was due to the court’s standard for
disregarding its prior holdings upon an intermediary Supreme
Court decision, which requires that the holding be “overruled.”249
242. See id. at 860 (“Our precedent establishes that whether an official was
deliberately indifferent requires both an objective and a subjective analysis.”).
243. See id. at 860 n.4 (stating the Plaintiff’s argument against the use of a
subjective standard).
244. Id.
245. See infra notes 246–257 and accompanying text (discussing the Fifth and
Eleventh Circuits’ analyses of Kingsley’s application to claims beyond the
excessive-force context).
246. See Nam Dang v. Sherriff, Seminole Cnty., 871 F.3d 1272, 1276–78 (11th
Cir. 2017) (establishing the circumstances that led to the appeal).
247. See id. at 1279 n.4 (“Kingsley itself notes that even when it comes to
pretrial detainees, ‘liability for negligently inflicted harm is categorically beneath
the threshold of constitutional due process.” (quoting Kingsley v. Hendrickson,
135 S. Ct. 2466, 2472 (2015))).
248. See id. at 1279 n.2 (rejecting application of the Kingsley doctrine).
249. See United States v. Kaley, 579 F.3d 1246, 1255 (11th Cir. 2009)
(discussing the applicable standard where a party argues that a prior holding of
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In the Eleventh Circuit, this only occurs where the Supreme
Court’s decision is “squarely on point” and “actually abrogate[s] or
directly conflict[s] with, as opposed to merely weaken[s],” the
applicable standard.250 Here, the court found that its precedent
was not overruled because Kingsley was an excessive-force claim,
as opposed to the claim of inadequate medical treatment before
it.251
The Fifth Circuit applied somewhat similar reasoning in a
case where Larry Alderson was placed with Louisiana Department
of Corrections (DOC) inmates due to a misclassification by
corrections staff, severely beaten and stabbed by some of them, and
then left in the cell with other DOC inmates for an hour after a
corrections officer came to document the incident with his camera
phone.252 Despite agreeing with the court’s finding that Alderson
had failed to properly state his claim, a concurring opinion noted
that the Fifth Circuit should revisit its adherence to deliberate
indifference as the applicable standard for pretrial detainees.253
The majority responded by pointing to the Fifth Circuit’s “rule
of orderliness.”254 This prevents a panel of the Court from declaring
void a prior panel’s interpretation of the law, even when it appears
to be flawed.255 The only way to overrule the earlier case is with a
statutory amendment or a decision by either the Supreme Court or
the Fifth Circuit sitting en banc.256 The majority then cited Fifth
the Eleventh Circuit is no longer good law).
250. See id. (“We would, of course, not only be authorized but also required to
depart from our prior decision if an intervening Supreme Court decision actually
overruled or conflicted with it.” (quoting Chambers v. Thompson, 150 F.3d 1324,
1326 (11th Cir. 1998))).
251. See Nam Dang, 871 F.3d at 1279 n.4 (rejecting the Plaintiff’s claim that
he need not demonstrate deliberate indifference).
252. See Alderson v. Concordia Par. Corr. Facility, 848 F.3d 415, 418–19 (5th
Cir. 2017) (“When Alderson asked [corrections officer] Bryant for medications that
he had been prescribed [following the incident] to prevent infection and alleviate
the pain, Bryant told him ‘[m]an up & wait til [sic] medical staff returns from the
Christmas holiday.”).
253. See id. at 424–25 (Graves, Jr., J., concurring) (“I write separately because
the Supreme Court’s decision in Kingsley v. Hendrickson appears to call into
question this court’s holding in Hare v. City of Corinth.”).
254. See id. at 419 n.4 (responding to the concurring opinion).
255. See Jacobs v. Nat’l Drug Intel. Ctr., 548 F.3d 375, 378 (5th Cir. 2008)
(discussing the Fifth Circuit’s rule of orderliness).
256. See id. (stating that the rule of orderliness applies absent an express
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Circuit cases applying deliberate indifference to pretrial detainees’
claims subsequent the Kingsley decision, making the rule of
orderliness applicable.257
IV. Detainees’ Claims Should Only Require Objective
Unreasonableness
“Deliberate indifference” should be removed from the lexicon
of terms applying to pretrial detainees’ conditions-of-confinement
claims. Objective unreasonableness should replace it as the
appropriate standard for culpability. Put simply, a pretrial
detainee should only have to prove that state actors were being
objectively unreasonable—as opposed to subjectively and
deliberately indifferent—when their acts or omissions contributed
to her injury.
There are four general justifications for this change. The first
is that substantive due process is an expansive concept, the
contours of which are not limited in the same way as the provisions
enumerated in the Bill of Rights.258 The second reason follows from
the first. Kingsley, consistent with an expansive interpretation of
due process, recognized a clear difference between the rights
afforded under the Cruel and Unusual Punishment Clause and
those afforded under the Fourteenth Amendment.259 This
difference applies even where prisoners and pretrial detainees
allege identical conduct.260 Third, the justifications for applying
deliberate indifference are unpersuasive in light of Kingsley and
the expansive interpretation of due process.261 Finally, the
overruling of the court’s precedent).
257. See Alderson, 848 F.3d at 419 n.4 (“Because the Fifth Circuit has
continued to rely on Hare and to apply subjective standard post-Kingsley, this
panel is bound by our rule of orderliness.”).
258. See infra notes 263–286 and accompanying text (defining the scope of
substantive due process).
259. See infra notes 288–303 and accompanying text (discussing Kingsley’s
recognition of a dichotomy between the rights afforded to prisoners and those
afforded to pretrial detainees).
260. See infra notes 305–338 and accompanying text (discussing the different
state-of-mind standards applied to excessive-force claims).
261. See infra notes 305–338 and accompanying text (comparing the proper
interpretation of due process to courts’ justifications for applying deliberate
indifference).
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objective standard is workable and makes a genuine difference in
practice.262
A. The Contours of Substantive Due Process Are Not Limited by
the Bill of Rights
The Fourteenth Amendment forbids States from depriving
“any person” of “liberty . . . without due process of law.”263 What is
this “liberty” to which our Constitution refers? Justice Cardozo
succinctly stated that it is “a concept of the greatest
generality . . . . Its limits are not mapped and charted.”264 Nor
should they be, as it is not a static concept.265 Instead, liberty under
the Fourteenth Amendment can only be defined with reference to
society’s attitude toward a particular government action at a given
point in time.266
Consistent with this dynamic interpretation is the Due
Process Clause’s relationship with the Bill of Rights.267 The specific
guarantees enumerated in the first eight amendments do not
define the scope of due process or the liberty that it protects.268
Instead, it consists of collective standards that take on their own
character, apart from and beyond the particular demands of the

262. See infra notes 339–356 and accompanying text (providing hypothetical
situations and applying different legal standards).
263. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1.
264. See BENJAMIN N. CARDOZO, THE NATURE OF THE JUDICIAL PROCESS 77
(1921) (“May restraints that were arbitrary yesterday be useful and rational and
therefore lawful today? May restraints that are arbitrary today become useful and
rational and therefore lawful tomorrow? I have no doubt that the answer to these
questions must be yes.”).
265. See id. at 77–78 (discussing the shift in our understanding of due process
near the end of the Nineteenth Century).
266. See Lochner v. New York, 198 U.S. 45, 76 (1905) (Holmes, J., dissenting)
(“I think that the word liberty in the Fourteenth Amendment is perverted when
it is held to prevent the natural outcome of a dominant opinion . . . .”).
267. Compare supra notes 264–266 and accompanying text (discussing the
flexible interpretation of “liberty” interests contained in the Due Process Clause),
with infra notes 266, 268, 269 and accompanying text (discussing the absence of
Bill of Rights-derived restraints on the Due Process Clause).
268. See Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 500 (1965) (Harlan, J.,
concurring) (“The Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment stands, in
my opinion, on its own bottom.”).
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Bill of Rights provisions.269 The Due Process Clause is expansive,
protecting against “all substantial arbitrary impositions and
purposeless restraints,”270 allowing it to recognize civil liberties
that are absent from the face of the Constitution.271
Due process rights stand on their own, even where their
analysis requires some reference to an enumerated right.272 Such
is the case with a pretrial detainee’s right to be free from harmful
conditions of confinement.273 Reference is often made to the Eighth
Amendment, even though detainees find relief under the Due
Process Clause.274 The connection between the two constitutional
provisions in this context is natural, as both detainees and
convicted prisoners are being held by law enforcement in similar
facilities.275

269. See Louisiana ex rel. Francis v. Resweber, 329 U.S. 459, 466–72 (1947)
(Frankfurter, J., concurring) (“Not until recently was it suggested that the Due
Process Clause . . . was merely a compendious reference to the Bill of Rights
whereby the States were now restricted in devising and enforcing their penal code
precisely as is the Federal Government by the first eight amendments.”); see also
Poe v. Ullman, 367 U.S. 497, 542 (1961) (Harlan, J., concurring) (“[T]he fact that
an identical provision is found among the first eight amendments . . . suggests
that due process is a discrete concept which subsists as an independent guaranty
of liberty and procedural fairness, more general and inclusive than the specific
prohibitions.”).
270. See Poe, 367 U.S. at 543 (defining liberty under the Due Process Clause
as a “rational continuum”).
271. Cf. Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 154 (1973) (recognizing the right to a
lawful abortion as a subcategory within the broader right to privacy); Loving v.
Virginia, 388 U.S. 1, 12 (1967) (recognizing the right to marriage); Allgeyer v.
Louisiana, 165 U.S. 578, 589 (1897) (recognizing various forms of economic
freedom).
272. See Griswold, 381 U.S. at 500 (Harlan, J., concurring) (“In my view, the
proper constitutional inquiry is whether this Connecticut statute offends the Due
Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment because the enactment violates
basic values ‘implicit in the concept of ordered liberty.”).
273. See infra notes 274–286 and accompanying text (discussing the reference
to Eighth-Amendment standards inherent in conditions-of-confinement claims).
274. See, e.g. Bell v. Wolfish, 441 U.S. 520, 535 n.4 (1979) (“The State does not
acquire the power to punish with which the Eighth Amendment is concerned until
after it has secured a formal adjudication of guilt . . . without such an
adjudication, the pertinent constitutional guarantee is the Due Process Clause of
the Fourteenth Amendment.”).
275. Cf. Hamm v. DeKalb Cnty., 774 F.2d 1567, 1574 (11th Cir. 1985)
(applying an Eighth-Amendment standard because prisoners and detainees are
often harmed in similar factual contexts).
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However, the provisions are not coextensive even when the
contextual similarities are considered.276 The rights afforded to
prisoners originate in the Cruel and Unusual Punishment
Clause.277 This subjects them to the particular demands of that
provision, as defined by its text and judicial doctrine.278 For
conditions-of-confinement claims, the doctrine imposes deliberate
indifference as the appropriate standard of culpability.279
Due process has its own character, “apart from and beyond the
particular demands” of the Cruel and Unusual Punishment
Clause.280 It is more flexible, general, and inclusive than all
provisions of the Eighth Amendment.281 Under the Due Process
Clause, pretrial detainees “retain at least those constitutional
rights” afforded to convicted prisoners.282
These principles demand that pretrial detainees’ rights be
viewed separately from those of convicted prisoners.283 Rote
application of Eighth-Amendment doctrine to an independent due
process right contradicts our understanding of the Fourteenth

276. See infra notes 267–271 (discussing the independent character of the Due
Process Clause).
277. See Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97, 104 (1976) (“We therefore conclude
that deliberate indifference to serious medical needs of prisoners constitutes the
‘unnecessary and wanton infliction of pain’ proscribed by the Eighth
Amendment.”).
278. See id. at 103–04 (describing conduct violative of the Cruel and Unusual
Punishment Clause as defined by judicial doctrine).
279. See 2 SILVER, supra note 3, § 8A.09 (Matthew Bender & Co. rev. ed. 2019)
(discussing various types of claims that may be brought under the Eighth
Amendment).
280. See Louisiana ex rel. Francis v. Resweber, 329 U.S. 459, 466–72 (1947)
(discussing the proper scope of the due process inquiry).
281. See Poe v. Ullman, 367 U.S. 497, 541–42 (1961) (Harlan, J., concurring)
However, it is not the particular enumeration of the rights in the first
eight Amendments which spells out the reach of Fourteenth
Amendment due process, but rather, as was suggested in another
context long before the adoption of that Amendment, those concepts
which are considered to embrace those rights ‘which are fundamental;
which belong to citizens of all free governments,’ for the purposes of
securing which men enter into society.
282. See Bell v. Wolfish, 441 U.S. 520, 545 (1979) (comparing the relative
constitutional liberties retained by convicted prisoners and pretrial detainees).
283. See supra notes 240–246 and accompanying text (discussing due process’
independent footing with respect to the Eight Amendment).
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Amendment.284 Due process is not limited in such a way.285 The
liberties afforded to detainees may be explored by reference to the
Cruel and Unusual Punishment Clause, but they stand on their
own, not to be defined by the text, scope, or particularities of that
provision,286 culpability requirements included.287
B. Kingsley Recognized A Different Culpability Standard for
Detainees’ Due Process Liberty
When the Supreme Court decided Kingsley v. Hendrickson in
2015, precedent required a subjective culpability standard for
excessive-force claims under the Eighth Amendment.288 The
defendants argued that the same standard should apply to
detainees’ Fourteenth-Amendment claims.289 The Court responded
by drawing a distinction between detainees and convicted
prisoners on one basis: That the two categories of plaintiffs are
protected by two different constitutional interests.290 Justice
Breyer stated:
The language of the two Clauses differs, and the nature of the
claims often differs. And most importantly, pretrial detainees
(unlike convicted prisoners) cannot be punished at all, much
less ‘maliciously and sadistically.’ Thus, there is no need here,
as there might be in an Eighth Amendment case, to determine
284. See supra notes 231–235 and accompanying text (discussing the broad
and flexible interpretation of the Due Process Clause).
285. See Louisiana ex rel. Francis v. Resweber, 329 U.S. 459, 466–72 (1947)
(stating that due process standards as “take on their own character, apart from
and beyond the particular demands of the Bill of Rights provisions”).
286. See supra notes 278–282 and accompanying text (comparing the
particularities of rights afforded under the Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments).
287. See Kingsley v. Hendrickson, 576 U.S. 389, 400–02 (2015) (stating that
cases discussing the Cruel and Unusual Punishment Clause do not apply to
state-of-mind issue before the Court).
288. Compare id. at 393–97 (“Kingsley filed a petition for certiorari asking us
to determine whether the requirements of a § 1983 excessive force claim brought
by a pretrial detainee must satisfy the subjective standard or only the objective
standard.”), with Hudson v. McMillan, 503 U.S. 1, 8 (1992) (“[W]e suggested that
the subjective aspect of an Eighth Amendment claim (with which the Court was
concerned) can be distinguished from the objective facet of the same claim.”).
289. See Kingsley, 576 U.S. at 400–02 (identifying cases brought by the
Defendants).
290. Id.
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when punishment is unconstitutional. [The Eighth Amendment
cases] are relevant here only insofar as they address the
practical importance of taking into account the legitimate
safety-related concerns of those who run jails.291

This language is consistent with the broad and independent
interpretation of the Due Process Clause.292 The particular
demands of the Cruel and Unusual Punishment Clause include an
awareness that harm sufficient to constitute punishment will
result.293 The Due Process Clause, on the other hand, is not
beholden to the same demands.294 Because of this, there is “no
need” for a court “to determine when punishment is
unconstitutional” for a pretrial detainee to succeed on her
due-process claim.295 The rights afforded to detainees under the
Due Process Clause are not coextensive with the rights afforded to
prisoners under the Eighth Amendment.296
Because due process is a discrete concept,297 any decisions
interpreting it should be either bound or persuaded by prior
authority doing the same.298 For pretrial detainees, the authority
reviewed by lower courts in determining culpability standards has
largely consisted of decisions interpreting the Eighth
Amendment.299 Although this practice has been inconsistent with
291. Id.
292. See infra notes 293–295 and accompanying text (comparing Kingsley’s
reasoning with the dynamic interpretation of the Due Process Clause).
293. See, e.g., U.S. CONST. amend. VIII, cl. 3 (“[N]or cruel and unusual
punishments inflicted.”); Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S. 825, 836–37 (1994)
(discussing the divergent standards of “recklessness” for civil law and criminal
law before holding that the latter standard applies to Eighth-Amendment claims).
294. See Louisiana ex rel. Francis v. Resweber, 329 U.S. 459, 466–72 (1947)
(discussing the independent character of the Due Process Clause).
295. Compare id. (stating that due process “consists of collective standards
which take on their own character . . . .”), with Kingsley v. Hendrickson, 135 S.
Ct. 2466, 2475 (2015) (rejecting the requirement of “punishment” for a pretrial
detainee’s due-process claim).
296. See Kingsley v. Hendrickson, 576 U.S. 389, 400–02 (2015)
(differentiating the rights afforded to pretrial detainees and convicted prisoners).
297. See JOHN M. WALKER, JR., THE ROLE OF PRECEDENT IN THE UNITED STATES:
HOW DO PRECEDENTS LOSE THEIR BINDING EFFECT? 2 (Jordan Corrente Beck ed.,
2016) (discussing the doctrine of stare decisis).
298. See Louisiana ex rel. Francis, 329 U.S. at 466–72 (stating that due
process is an “independent guaranty of liberty and procedural fairness”).
299. See 2 SILVER, supra note 3, § 8A.09 (“Although pre-trial detainees are not
encompassed by the Eighth Amendment, 14th Amendment claims are generally
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the concept that due process is free of the Bill of Rights’
particularities,300 it has primarily occurred in the absence of any
clear doctrine by the Supreme Court.301 Now, however, the
particularities of the Due Process Clause’s protection of pretrial
detainees have been clarified.302 In opposition of the subjective
standards that generally apply under the Eight Amendment,303 the
Kingsley Court stated that “a pretrial detainee can prevail by
providing only objective evidence that the challenged government
action is not rationally related to a legitimate governmental
objective or that it is excessive in relation to that purpose.”304
C. Courts’ Justifications for Applying Deliberate Indifference Are
Unpersuasive in Light of Kingsley and The Broad Interpretation
of Due Process
Two general arguments have been used in reasoning that
deliberate indifference is the appropriate culpability standard for
pretrial detainees’ due-process claims.305 The first essentially
draws on interpretive comparisons between the Eighth and
Fourteenth Amendments,306 while the second considers the
operational realities of managing correctional facilities.307 For the
analyzed by the “deliberate indifference” standard.”).
300. See supra notes 272–287 and accompanying text (stating that due
process rights “stand on their own, not determined by the text, scope, or
particularities” of the Cruel and Unusual Punishment Clause).
301. See 2 SILVER, supra note 3, § 8A.09(4)(a) (“Although its logical soundness
is questionable, in the absence of Supreme Court guidance, lower courts have
often applied the exacting standards of deliberate indifference (applicable to
‘punishments’) to jail conditions.”).
302. See infra note 303 and accompanying text (stating the Supreme Court’s
requirement for pretrial detainees’ due-process claims).
303. See 2 SILVER, supra note 3, § 8A.09 (enumerating prisoners’ claims that
require a showing of deliberate indifference).
304. See Kingsley v. Hendrickson, 576 U.S. 389, 396–400 (2015) (“Bell’s focus
on punishment does not mean that proof of intent (or motive) to punish is required
for a pretrial detainee to prevail on a claim that his due process rights were
violated.”).
305. See supra notes 105–172 and accompanying text (discussing courts’
justifications for the application of the deliberate-indifference standard).
306. See supra notes 108–187 and accompanying text (discussing
considerations that factor into the meanings of both constitutional provisions).
307. See supra notes 123–198 and accompanying text (discussing
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reasons discussed below, neither of these justifications is
persuasive.308
1. Interpretive Comparisons
Two interpretive comparisons have been made for justifying
the attachment of Eighth-Amendment standards to due-process
claims.309 The first is that both amendments “draw [their] meaning
from evolving standards of decency that mark the progress of a
maturing society.”310 This fails to account for the differences
between the two provisions.311 Simply because the rights provided
under both are dynamic does not mean that they are equivalent.312
Under the Eighth Amendment, the phrase means that the
State, though having the power to punish, is confined to only doing
so “within the limits of civilized standards.”313 The meaning of the
term under due process states that conduct is violative when it is
“repugnant to the conscience of mankind.”314 Though both
definitions are somewhat open-ended, one discernible difference
between the two is clear: The state has no power to punish under
the Due Process Clause.315 Punishment requires a state actor to
considerations for corrections staff in facilities that house both convicted
prisoners and pretrial detainees).
308. See infra notes 309–322 and accompanying text (comparing courts’
reasoning for applying deliberate indifference to due-process claims in light of
judicial precedent).
309. See supra notes 108–122 and accompanying text (stating the positions of
the Ninth and Seventh Circuit Courts of Appeals when they initially applied
deliberate indifference to pretrial detainees’ claims).
310. See Redman v. Cnty. of San Diego, 942 F.2d 1435, 1441 (9th Cir. 1991)
(comparing the Due Process and Cruel and Unusual Punishment Clauses).
311. See supra notes 272–282 and accompanying text (delineating the rights
afforded under the two constitutional provisions).
312. See supra notes 276–286 and accompanying text (discussing the unique
character of the Due Process Clause).
313. See Trop v. Dulles, 356 U.S. 86, 100 (1958) (“Fines, imprisonment and
even execution may be imposed depending on the enormity of the crime, but any
technique outside the bounds of these traditional penalties is constitutionally
suspect.”).
314. See Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97, 105–06 (1976) (discussing precedent
that touches on the respective meanings of the two constitutional provisions).
315. See Kingsley, 576 U.S. at 400–02 (distinguishing the rights afforded
under the Due Process Clause and those derived from the Cruel and Unusual
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appreciate her conduct,316 but Kingsley tells us that there is no
such requirement when the plaintiff’s rights are derived from due
process.317
The second comparison states that pretrial detainees’
due-process rights are “at least as great as” those afforded under
the Cruel and Unusual Punishment Clause.”318 This at least
recognizes that they are not coextensive.319 However, the
statement itself fails to explain why detainees should be subject to
a requirement that is peculiar to Eighth-Amendment analysis.320
If anything, it tends to support the independent interpretation of
the Due Process Clause,321 which rejects the idea that it is beholden
to the “particular demands” of any specific Bill of Rights provision,
including the Cruel and Unusual Punishment Clause.322
2. Operational Realities
Many correctional facilities hold both convicted prisoners and
pretrial detainees.323 Because of this reality, the deliberate
indifference standard has been applied to detainees’ claims as
“distinguishing” due process and Eighth-Amendment standards
and “would require courts to evaluate the details of slight
Punishment Clause).
316. See supra note 293 and accompanying text (discussing the threshold for
state-of-mind issues involving unconstitutional punishment).
317. See Kingsley, 576 U.S. at 400–02 (“[P]retrial detainees cannot be
punished at all, much less maliciously and sadistically.”).
318. See Hall v. Ryan, 957 F.2d 402, 405 (7th Cir. 1992) (justifying the
application of deliberate indifference to due-process claims).
319. See supra notes 276–287 and accompanying text (contrasting the
contours of the two constitutional provisions).
320. See infra note 324 and accompanying text (discussing application of the
deliberate indifference standard to detainees’ claims).
321. Compare Hall v. Ryan, 957 F.2d 402, 405 (7th Cir. 1992) (“[P]retrial
detainees’ due process rights are ‘at least as great as’ those afforded under the
Cruel and Unusual Punishment Clause.”), with Bell v. Wolfish, 441 U.S. 520, 545
(1979) (“Under the Due Process Clause, pretrial detainees retain ‘at least those
constitutional rights’ afforded to convicted prisoners.”).
322. See Louisiana ex rel. Francis v. Resweber, 329 U.S. 459, 466–72 (1947)
(discussing the independent character of the Due Process Clause).
323. See Hamm v. DeKalb Cnty., 774 F.2d 1567, 1574 (11th Cir. 1985)
(justifying the application of deliberate indifference to pretrial detainees’ claims).
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differences in conditions.”324 This argument is premised on
language by the Supreme Court that cautioned lower courts from
becoming “enmeshed in the minutiae of prison operations.”325
There are two issues with this use of authority.326
The first starts with the Supreme Court’s warning itself.327 In
context, the Court was cautioning against judicial solutions for
operational issues in place of those devised by corrections
officials.328 It explicitly drew a line, however, at the point where
the officials’ solutions would violate “any prohibition of the
Constitution.”329 The Due Process Clause and Eighth Amendment
each contain unique constitutional prohibitions.330 In accordance
with the dynamic interpretation of the Due Process Clause, the
analyses of these separate prohibitions are not parallel.331
Therefore, a court may be required “to evaluate the details of slight
differences in conditions” when faced with two plaintiffs, one

324. See id. (“This court holds that in regard to providing pretrial detainees
with such basic necessities as food, living space, and medical care the minimum
standard allowed by the due process clause is the same as that allowed by the
eighth amendment for convicted persons.”).
325. See Bell v. Wolfish, 441 U.S. 520, 562 (1979) (“There was a time not too
long ago when the federal judiciary took a completely ‘hands-off’ approach to the
problem of prison administration. In recent years, however, these courts have
largely disregarded this ‘hands-off’ attitude and waded into this complex arena.”).
326. See infra notes 327–337 and accompanying text (discussing issues with
courts’ practical justification for applying deliberate indifference to pretrial
detainees’ claims).
327. See infra notes 328–332 and accompanying text (providing context to
judicial precedent).
328. See Bell v. Wolfish, 441 U.S. 520, 562 (1979) (“The deplorable conditions
and Draconian restrictions of some of our Nation’s prisons are too well known to
require recounting here, and federal courts rightly have condemned these sordid
aspects of our prison systems.”).
329. See id. (“This does not mean that constitutional rights are not to be
scrupulously observed.”).
330. See Poe v. Ullman, 367 U.S. 497, 542 (1961) (Harlan, J., concurring)
(“[D]ue process is a discrete concept which subsists as an independent guaranty
of liberty and procedural fairness, more general and inclusive than the specific
prohibitions.”).
331. See supra notes 266–282 (discussing the individual character and scope
of the Due Process Clause); see also Kingsley v. Hendrickson, 576 U.S. 389, 400–
02 (2015) (stating that Eighth Amendment cases “are relevant here only insofar
as they address the practical importance of taking into account the legitimate
safety-related concerns of those who run jails”).
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pointing at the Due Process Clause and the other claiming
protection under the Eighth Amendment.332
The second issue with the justification comes from Kingsley.333
There, the Court noted that its objective unreasonableness
analysis must be done with “deference to the policies and practices
needed to maintain order and institutional security.”334
Essentially, the objective analysis is not blind to “the legitimate
interests in managing a jail.”335 This is consistent with the
requirement that courts refrain from becoming “enmeshed in the
minutiae of prison operations.”336 However, the Supreme Court did
not see deference to corrections officials as an impediment
preventing the formulation of different culpability standards for
prisoners and pretrial detainees.337 While institutional concerns
must be considered in litigation arising out of correctional
facilities, they are not sufficient to justify the transplantation of an
Eighth-Amendment culpability standard to due-process claims.338

332. Compare Hamm v. DeKalb Cnty., 774 F.2d 1567, 1574 (11th Cir. 1985)
(justifying the parallel application of deliberate indifference on the basis that
applying separate analyses to the two constitutional provisions would require it
to become “enmeshed in the minutiae of prison operations”), with supra notes
323–331 (discussing the requirement that courts treat due process as
independent of the demands of the Eighth Amendment, even where doing so
would require it to become “enmeshed in the minutiae of prison operations”).
333. See infra notes 334–336 and accompanying text (discussing the
requirement that courts be deferential to the decisions of corrections officials).
334. See Kingsley v. Hendrickson, 576 U.S. 389, 398–401 (2015) (discussing
the workability of an objective standard in excessive-force claims).
335. See id. (noting that courts must take into account the State’s legitimate
interests in operating correctional facilities).
336. Compare id. (requiring “deference to the policies and practices needed to
maintain order and institutional security”), with Bell v. Wolfish, 441 U.S. 520,
562 (1979) (“The wide range of ‘judgment calls’ that meet constitutional and
statutory requirements are confided to officials outside of the Judicial Branch of
the Government.”).
337. See id. at 396–401 (finding that an objective standard should apply to
pretrial detainees while noting that courts must be deferential to corrections
officials and conceding that a subjective standard applies to convicted prisoners
in a similar context).
338. Cf. id. (applying different standards and considering the concerns of
corrections officials).
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D. The Objective Standard Makes a Big Difference While
Requiring a Small Change
The distinction in the tests that courts will apply under either
deliberate indifference or objective unreasonableness is minute.339
Only one element for any given conditions-of-confinement claim
will require a change.340 However, the success of a pretrial
detainee’s claim may hinge on the distinction.341
In practice, the only difference between an objective standard
and deliberate indifference is how a defendant’s “reckless” state of
mind is defined.342 Deliberate indifference entails two prongs.343
The first asks whether the deprivation alleged objectively results
“in the denial of the minimal civilized measure of life’s
necessities.”344 There have been a number of decisions defining
conduct sufficient to meet this requirement in different contexts.345
The second prong requires that the defendant is aware of a
substantial risk of harm to the plaintiff, but disregards that risk
in her intentional acts or omissions.346 This second requirement
essentially asks whether the defendant was criminally reckless
with respect to her conduct.347

339. See Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S. 825, 834 (1994) (defining the difference
between objective unreasonableness and deliberate indifference).
340. See infra notes 348–352 (describing the different definitions of
“recklessness” as applied to conditions-of-confinement claims).
341. See infra notes 353–356 and accompanying text (providing a hypothetical
situation and applying both state-of-mind standards).
342. See infra notes 343–351 and accompanying text (explaining the
difference between deliberate indifference and objective unreasonableness).
343. See Farmer, 511 U.S. at 834 (defining the requirements for a violation of
the Cruel and Unusual Punishment Clause).
344. See id. (“[T]he deprivation alleged must be, objectively, sufficiently
serious . . .”).
345. See 2 SILVER, supra note 3, § 8A.09(4)(e)(iii)(A) (providing examples of
deprivations that have been held to violate the Eighth Amendment).
346. See Farmer, 511 U.S. at 837 (“[T]he official must both be aware of facts
from which the inference could be drawn that a substantial risk of serious harm
exists, and he must also draw that inference.”).
347. See id. at 836–37 (“The criminal law, however, generally permits a
finding of recklessness only when a person disregards a risk of harm of which he
is aware.”).
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The test for objective unreasonableness retains the first prong
of the deliberate indifference analysis.348 The second prong,
however, would drop the requirement that the defendant was
aware of a substantial risk of harm to the plaintiff.349 Instead, the
substantial risk of harm would have to be “so obvious that it should
be known” by the defendant.350 The conduct must be intentional,
but the defendant need not be aware of the risk of harm created by
that conduct.351 Unlike deliberate indifference, this standard only
requires recklessness akin to that found in tort law.352
Although there is only one difference between the two tests,
the success of a pretrial detainee’s claim may hinge on which is
applied.353 Suppose that Corey, an African-American man, is
arrested on a Friday evening in Dallas for driving under the
influence. Dennis and Mac, two members of the white-nationalist
organization Vanguard America, were arrested the night before
when police officers raided their apartment and discovered a closet
packed with C-4, a plastic explosive. All three of the arrestees were
transported to the Dallas County Detention Center.
Charlie, a corrections officer at the Detention Center, arrived
at work on Friday morning to find fervent discussion about Dennis
and Mac. He was informed that both detainees had previously been
incarcerated for various violent crimes and that Dennis is wanted
for questioning out of state in connection with the disappearance
of a local American Civil Liberties Union officer. Charlie is even
directed to the detainees’ social media profiles, which primarily
consist of violent threats directed at minority groups and demands
for an insurrection against the Federal Government.
348. See Castro v. Cnty. of L.A., 833 F.3d 1060, 1070–71 (9th Cir. 2016)
(stating that “the deprivation alleged must objectively be sufficiently serious”)
(emphasis omitted).
349. See id. at 1071 (“[A] pretrial detainee need not prove those subjective
elements about the officer’s actual awareness of the level of risk.”).
350. See Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S. 825, 836 (1994) (comparing different
standards of recklessness).
351. See Castro, 833 F.3d at 1070–71 (explaining the different state-of-mind
standards for a defendant’s awareness of a risk and her physical acts or
omissions).
352. See Farmer, 511 U.S. at 836 (stating that “the term recklessness is not
self-defining”).
353. See supra subsection IV.D (discussing the different standards applied
between “deliberate indifference” and “objective unreasonableness”).

GIVING DUE PROCESS ITS DUE

701

After Corey is processed at the Detention Center, Charlie must
assign and escort him to a holding cell. Corey is so inebriated that
he can hardly stand, so Charlie has to support him during their
walk. The cell Corey is assigned to contains both Dennis and Mac.
Without so much of a thought, Charlie drags him into the cell and
hastily walks away to go on break. After he returns to the
Detention Center, Charlie learns that Corey sustained serious
injuries in an attack by his cellmates.
Corey files a § 1983 claim against Charlie on the basis that he
failed to protect him from the assault, in violation of the Due
Process Clause. Because he filed the claim in Texas, the court will
require Corey to demonstrate that Charlie was deliberately
indifferent.354 If the litigation reaches a jury, Corey must convince
them that Charlie was aware of the risk that other detainees would
assault him, but disregarded that risk and left him in the cell
anyway.355 If the jury finds that Charlie was not thinking about
the potential risk because he was in a hurry to get to lunch, Corey’s
claim fails.
Suppose instead that all of this occurred in Las Vegas. A court
there would apply objective unreasonableness instead of deliberate
indifference.356 Corey is not required to prove that Charlie was
actually aware of the risk, but only that he should have been aware
of it.357 Charlie knew that Dennis and Mac were violent and racist.
He also knew that they had stockpiled weapons of mass
destruction. Finally, Charlie knew that Corey was a member of a
group that his cellmates had violently threatened and that he was
in a vulnerable state. On the basis of these facts, Corey can prevail
by demonstrating that Charlie should have been aware of the risk
that he would be assaulted in the cell. Unlike the proceedings in
Texas, a court in Nevada will not deny him relief simply because
the defendant was in a hurry.
354. See Alderson v. Concordia Par. Corr. Facility, 848 F.3d 415, 419 n.4 (5th
Cir. 2017) (applying deliberate indifference to a failure-to-protect claim).
355. See supra notes 344–346 and accompanying text (describing the
subjective component of the deliberate-indifference analysis).
356. See Castro v. Cnty. of L.A., 833 F.3d 1060, 1071 (9th Cir. 2016) (applying
an objective unreasonableness standard for conditions-of-confinement claims
brought by pretrial detainees).
357. See supra notes 348–351 and accompanying text (describing the
state-of-mind requirement of the objective unreasonableness analysis).
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V. Conclusion

The application of deliberate indifference to pretrial detainees’
conditions-of-confinement claims has always been in error. The
Fourteenth Amendment demanded something different from the
start. Admittedly, courts were somewhat in the dark with respect
to what that should be. Now, however, Kingsley has provided
much-needed visibility. It is time for courts to abandon the
subjective inquiry and instead ask whether those acting under
color of state law were objectively unreasonable when they
deprived detainees of their constitutional liberties afforded by the
Due Process Clause.

